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ABSTRACT
UNIFIED ARCHITECTURE OF THE MOBILE AD HOC NETWORK
SECURITY (MANS) SYSTEM
by
Li Ling
In this dissertation, a unified architecture of Mobile Ad-hoc Network Security (MANS)
system is proposed, under which IDS agent, authentication, recovery policy and other
policies can be defined formally and explicitly, and are enforced by a uniform
architecture. A new authentication model for high-value transactions in cluster-based
MANET is also designed in MANS system. This model is motivated by previous works
but try to use their beauties and avoid their shortcomings, by using threshold sharing of
the certificate signing key within each cluster to distribute the certificate services, and
using certificate chain and certificate repository to achieve better scalability, less
overhead and better security performance. An Intrusion Detection System is installed in
every node, which is responsible for colleting local data from its host node and neighbor
nodes within its communication range, pro-processing raw data and periodically
broadcasting to its neighborhood, classifying normal or abnormal based on pro-processed
data from its host node and neighbor nodes. Security recovery policy in ad hoc networks
is the procedure of making a global decision according to messages received from
distributed IDS and restore to operational health the whole system if any user or host that
conducts the inappropriate, incorrect, or anomalous activities that threaten the
connectivity or reliability of the networks and the authenticity of the data traffic in the
networks. Finally, quantitative risk assessment model is proposed to numerically evaluate
MANS security.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Mobile Ad Hoc networks (MANET) are kind of networks that do not rely on any fixed
infrastructure; instead, all networking functions (e.g., routing, mobility management, etc.)
are implemented by the nodes themselves. MANET technologies seek to provide mobile
user "anytime, anywhere" networking services potentially, even in disaster area and
battle fields.
The challenge of provision of security in Mobile Ad-Hoc Network (MANET)
environments is tackled in this dissertation. The most important characterizing feature of
a MANET is the absence of any node in a central role. So many security services that rely
on central services, such as naming services, certification authorities (CA), network-
based intrusion detection and other recovery administrative services will be impossible or
at least much harder to implement. Another nagging major challenge is that of the
compromised node(s); this could be an overtaken attacked node or a physically captured
node. This forces all MANET nodes to operate in a mode that "trusts no peer" that
complicates and inhibits security services [1], [2], [3].
Protection of Ad Hoc networks basically focus on two aspects: Intrusion
Prevention, such as traffic encryption, sending data through multiple paths, authentication
and authorization; Intrusion Detection, such as Anomaly pattern examination, Protocol
analytical study. However, intrusion prevention cannot guard against internal attacks
when an adversary has broken in, while intrusion detection itself is not enough because:
Detecting intrusion must compiled with recovery response to remove the malicious hosts;
IDS can only rely on partial and local data because of lack of traffic concentration, such
2as routers and switches in Ad Hoc networks; Separation between normal and abnormal is
difficult in Ad Hoc networks.
In this dissertation, the architecture of the Mobile Ad-hoc Network Security
(MANS) System is proposed, under which authentication agent, IDS agent, recovery
policy and other policies can be defined formally and explicitly, and are enforced by a
uniform architecture. As a basic preventive solution, a fully localized, digital certificate
base authentication services is proposed. An intrusion Detection and response system
(IDS) provides the corrective solution feeding the certificate services with information
about misbehaving nodes, which are eliminated from the network by certificate
revocation. Both certificate services and IDS are designed to be robust even in the
presence of compromised nodes.
Authentication service is based on asymmetric cryptographic techniques,
specifically RSA algorithms. Authentication service is provided by taking a certificate-
based approach. An IDS is installed in every node, which is responsible for colleting
local data from its host node and neighbor nodes within its communication range, pro-
processing raw data and periodically broadcasting to its neighborhood, classifying normal
or abnormal based on pro-processed data from its host node and neighbor nodes.
Security recovery policy in ad hoc networks is the procedure of making a global
decision according to messages received from distributed IDS and restore to operational
health the whole system if any user or host that conducts the inappropriate, incorrect, or
anomalous activities that threaten the connectivity or reliability of the networks and the
authenticity of the data traffic in the networks.
3MANET routing protocol is also secured by combing Certificate-based
authentication and Intrusion Detection in MANS architecture. Quantitative risk
assessment model is also proposed to numerically evaluate MANS security.
CHAPTER 2
ARCHITECTURE OF MANS SYSTEM
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 What is Security?
Stoneburner in his draft version of the NIST recommendation states the goal of the IT
security as follows:
The goal of information technology security is to enable an organization to meet
all of its mission/business objectives by implementing systems with due care
consideration of IT-related risks to the organization, its partners and its customers [32].
The security goals can be achieved by considering some security objectives or
security requirements. Several people have classified these requirements or objectives in
different ways but the following classification covers all the issues and groups them
properly. This classification of security objectives is extracted from [32].
Availability: Availability of a system assures that the system works properly and
the services are available or not denied to authorized users. It should also ensure that the
system is available to the intended users and for intended use only. This objective
protects against the following
• Intentional or accidental attempts to either perform unauthorized deletion of data
or cause a denial of service or data.
• Attempts to use a system or data for unauthorised purpose.
Integrity: Integrity, in the IT world, contains two aspects — data integrity and
system integrity. Data integrity means that the data is free from unauthorised
4
5manipulation. Unauthorised manipulation of data can happen either in storage, during
processing or during transmission. Like data integrity, system integrity means that the
system has not been manipulated or even accessed in an unauthorised manner.
Confidentiality: Confidentiality of data or system information means that only the
intended user receives the information and that the information is not disclosed to any
unauthorised individual. The confidentiality principle applies to data in storage,
processing, and in transmission.
Accountability: Accountability is a requirement that actions of an entity must be
traced uniquely to that entity. This requirement becomes more and more important as
business becomes increasingly dependent on IT. Accountability becomes significant for
issues like non-repudiation, fault isolation, intrusion detection and prevention, after-
action recovery and legal action.
Assurance: Assurance is required to show that the security measures have been
properly implemented and they work as intended. When an implementation has
implemented the functionality correctly, has sufficient protection against unintentional
errors and has sufficient resistance to intentional penetration then it can be considered
that the objectives have been adequately met.
Authors in [32] also propose a very comprehensive security model that can form
the architectural basis in IT security. This model shows the primary services, supporting
services and relationship between them. This model consists of support, prevention and
recovery related services. Support services are quite generic and form the foundation of
security; preventive services concentrate on preventing any security compromise before it
6happens and finally the recovery services deal with identifying any security breach and
recovering the system from it.
Figure 2.1 Security services mode.
2.1.2 Security Challenges for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
Recently research about MANET is focus on routing protocols, many security issues
lave not been treated yet. Provision of security in Mobile Ad-Hoc Network environments
s challenging, compared with wired networks because:
• Mobile ad hoc networks do not have centralized monitoring and/or management
points. All the hosts involved share responsibilities. So many security services
that rely on central services, such as naming services, certification authorities
(CA), network-based intrusion detection and other recovery administrative
services will be impossible or at least much harder to implement.
7• Because of node mobility, the network topology changes dynamically. This
changes the trust relationship between the participating hosts and requires
dynamic configuration both in the network and in the hosts.
• The nodes communicate only via wireless links and these links are open to
eavesdropping, replay and spoofing.
• The nodes are generally battery-powered, therefore, the communication and
computing costs are limited.
• Because of the physical characteristics (memory, processor etc) of the mobile
nodes, the computational power is limited.
• Mobile hosts can be physically captured and compromised. If a host gets
compromised and the network cannot detect this then the attack can come from
inside the network. Therefore, any security architecture should avoid having any
central entity so that compromise of one entity does not risk the whole network.
• A compromised host also means that routing is compromised as well. The host
can easily send incorrect routing information and it is not very easy to detect
this.
• Moreover, once a compromised host gets key or certificate, authentication is
bypassed. This forces all MANET nodes to operate in a mode that "trusts no
peer" that complicates and inhibits security services.
2.1.3 Motivation of Unified Security Architecture for MANET
First of all, the challenge of provision of security in Mobile Ad-Hoc Network (MANET)
environments is discussed in this section. The most important characterizing feature of a
MANET is the absence of any node in a central role. So many security services that rely
on central services, such as naming services, certification authorities (CA), network-
based intrusion detection and other recovery administrative services will be impossible or
at least much harder to implement. Another nagging major challenge is that of the
compromised node(s); this could be an overtaken attacked node or a physically captured
node. This forces all MANET nodes to operate in a mode that "trusts no peer" that
complicates and inhibits security services [1], [2], [3].
8Protection of Ad Hoc networks basically focus on two aspects: Intrusion
Prevention, such as Traffic encryption, Sending data through multiple paths,
Authentication and authorization; Intrusion Detection, such as Anomaly pattern
examination, Protocol analytical study. However, intrusion prevention cannot guard
against internal attacks when an adversary has broken in, while intrusion detection itself
is not enough because: Detecting intrusion must compiled with recovery response to
remove the malicious hosts; IDS can only rely on partial and local data because of lack of
traffic concentration, such as routers and switches in Ad Hoc networks; Separation
between normal and abnormal is difficult in Ad Hoc networks.
Therefore, a unified security architecture is needed because:
• Ad Hoc networks are distributed systems whose nodes may have little, if any
knowledge of other nodes;
• Different agents, policies needs to be included to achieve different security
goals;
• Different agent operating within that network may find itself interacting with
others. For example, IDS agent, routing agent and authentication agent.
We proposed in this chapter a unified security architecture (MANS), under which
IDS agent, authentication, recovery policy and other policies can be defined formally and
explicitly, and are enforced by a uniform architecture.
Authentication module is based on asymmetric cryptographic techniques,
specifically RSA algorithms [21]. Basically, our work are motivated by previous works
such as [7], [12], [18], [26] and the clustering phenomenon in ad hoc networks [25]. We
provide authentication service by taking a certificate-based approach.
An IDS is also installed in every node, which is responsible for colleting local
data from its host node and neighbor nodes within its communication range, pro-
9processing raw data and periodically broadcasting to its neighborhood, classifying normal
or abnormal based on pro-processed data from its host node and neighbor nodes.
Security recovery policy in ad hoc networks is the procedure of making a global
decision according to messages received from distributed IDS and restore to operational
health the whole system if any user or host that conducts the inappropriate, incorrect, or
anomalous activities that threaten the connectivity or reliability of the networks and the
authenticity of the data traffic in the networks.
In this chapter, we describe a fully decentralized scalable security recovery policy
for MANETs. It is Law-Governed [4] and formally extends the ideas of the Local
Collaborative Groups by defining neighborhoods and their states. In the following
sections, we first present the concept of our recovery policy, then describe the
architecture of developing this recovery policy following the formal steps of
specification, implementation, and enforcement, which is the development life cycle
described in [5].
2.2 LCG-based Security Recovery Policy
The security recovery policy P is formally defined as the pentuple {M, G, L , N, MN [4]:
• P is the explicit and enforced set of principles of interaction among the members
of this group, as we have defined later, which states which response should be
taken in which cases.
• G is a distributed group of agents, called the P-Group, that are permitted to send
and receive P-Messages, and are the participants in policy P. Here, G includes
all mobile nodes in the MANETs.
• M is the predefined set of messages that may be exchanged among all the
member agents. Messages are regulated by P. They are called P-Messages.
These messages are generally small messages that are sent from neighborhood to
10
neighborhood or broadcast through the entire network. Examples are messages
for Voting-Request, Authentication-Update, Voting-Decision, and other small
messages. This kind of message has higher priority than type MN messages .
• N is the neighborhood of each node within G. In our recovery policy, each node
keeps next-hop information, periodically, as its neighborhood history. Each time
when neighborhood voting is needed, each node can calculate its current
neighborhood N based on current neighborhood information and history
information.
• MN are also P-Messages regulated by P. The difference is that these are
messages of only neighborhood reach, sent only through the neighborhood.
They typically include IDS information for each neighborhood node and
neighborhood decision management messages. In our security policy, these kind
of messages are limited to the local neighborhood; it is only neighborhood
voting and decision results that may be more widely disseminated by
broadcasting them through the network. This largely local reach of MN
messages, reduces security related traffic overhead. This messaging scheme
also scales well, as it increases linearly with the number of nodes.
Following [4] and others, L is the set of rules regulating the exchange of P-
Message between members of group G, called the law of this system. Generally, the law
determines who can send which message to whom, and what the effect of that message
should be.
The security recovery policy P defines the outcomes of regulated events
occurring at members of G. The policy is defined locally for each agent but applies
globally to all agents throughout the MANET. The policy P, thus defined, regulates
explicitly only local events at individual agents and mandates only local operations to be
carried out. Nevertheless, the policy P is globally obeyed and P-messages can be
broadcast throughout the whole MANET. Working together with other services such as
Routing, Authentication and Intrusion Detection, the locally regulated policy can affect
the whole network.
11
2.3 Neighborhood Based "Watch"
For example, either periodically or triggered by some event, the nodes of a neighborhood
send out an IDS Status (x) (MN message) of their own IDS summary but raw
information to all the other nodes in their neighborhood; in this manner, all nodes
continuously are cognizant of the IDS monitoring results and security status of all the
other neighborhood nodes, in addition, of course, to their own. Thus, if a security breach
is imminent, say at node A, this will be simultaneously and independently arrived at, not
only by node A, but by all other nodes in the neighborhood of A, since all the nodes in
the neighborhood of A carry continuous and current updates of activity at A, just as A
does, by virtue of the IDS_Status updating messages. In other words, the IDS of a node
processes raw summary information of its own activity as well as that of all other node in
its neighborhood. Again, either periodically or triggered by some event, a node may vote
about the security status of a neighbor node, say of node A. If five nodes comprise the
neighborhood of A, five votes regarding the security status of A will be cast, one from
each node in the neighborhood. Since the votes reflect IDS decisions that process the
same raw information, each vote cast carries the identically valid evaluation of the
security status of A. Therefore, even if A has in the meantime been compromised and
taken over, and tells a lie in the vote regarding its own security status, the other four votes
will reveal the truth of the security breach (majority voting). These votes will be
transmitted within the neighborhood (MN message). Thus, each node in the
neighborhood will conclude that A has been compromised. This result of the compromise
of A may now be broadcast (M message) from each neighborhood node throughout the
MANET, resulting in countermeasures against A.
12
2.4 Local Collaborative Groups (LCG)-Majority Voting
This is called Local Collaborative Groups (LCGs)- based majority voting. By this way,
each neighbor node arrives at a decision for the node being voted on. If the decision is
that the node is compromised, each of the neighbor nodes will broadcast throughout the
whole network a message: Delete (x) (M message). When the other nodes in the networks
receive a majority carrying that message, they take appropriate countermeasures, i.e.,
they may update their routing tables to change the routing topology, thus isolating and
routing around the offending node. From this example, it can be seen that by locally
regulating messages with the global law, while working together with other security
modules, security recovery can be implemented effectively in MANETs.
In the following sections, we describe this LCG-based security recovery policy in
more detail.
When we are developing a security recovery policy, it is assumed that an intrusion
detection system (IDS) agent is already installed in each node. The function of the IDS
agent is to monitor the host node in which the IDS agent resides, as well as its neighbor
nodes, and to detect any intrusion or anomaly occurring to all these local nodes that
comprise the neighborhood.
Each host and its neighbor nodes comprise the Local Collaborative Group. When
we are speaking of "neighbor nodes", we mean they are the most recently used or most
common used nodes, which are within the radio range of the host node. There are two
ways to define and generate the neighborhood of each node. First, a node can construct
its neighborhood directly from the MAC layer, assuming that the neighborhood can be
well defined according to the MAC protocol employed. The second way is to generate
13
the neighborhood from the routing table. Here, the traffic intensity will affect the size of
the neighborhood that will be generated.
Figure 2.2 The concept of Local Collaborative Group (LCG) voting.
Moreover, the question of arriving at a reliable IDS decision, in the face of
attacks, needs to be addressed. The answer, in general, lies in collaborative decision
making for an IDS outcome determination. The IDS at each node in a neighborhood can
solicit the input of its neighbors; the totality of the findings of the responding nodes will
be weighed by majority voting and then the outcome of this vote will be broadcasted to
all nodes. A compromised node has no motive to declare attack falsely, in the case of no
attack; however, in the case of a network attack, found by the neighbors, it will be
outvoted, so that the correct decision will be arrived at.
Figure 2.2 shows a sample topology used for LCG voting. In Figure 2.2, Ax,y
means the intrusion detection decision made by the IDS system in Node y, according to
14
trace data that node y monitored at Node x, which means " Node y says, I am monitoring
my neighbor node x, and now I conclude that it is normal or under attack or
compromised, etc.". The IDS system in each node monitors its host node as well as its
neighbor nodes, and maintains a table of intrusion detection decisions for itself and its
neighbor nodes. This is the method of Collaborative Local Intrusion Detection (CLIDE).
During the operation of CLIDE, the IDS agent on each node may operate and report in an
asynchronous or synchronous mode (periodically). Suppose the IDS reports periodically,
and AODV is used as the routing protocol. Our security policy is stated as:
• Each node sends its agent (state information) to all its neighbors with period Ti.
• A node has no incentive to falsely volunteer that it has been attacked
successfully. Thus, if a node declares itself to be the victim of an attack it should
be accepted at face value and declared to be so. This would occur when a node
has strong evidence of attack (security level code: SecCon 3), against itself, thus
this node should be isolated from the network. This situation may arise for only
some of the attack types.
• When CLIDE reports "suspicious" activity (security level code: SecCon 2) at a
node, for example, Node 1, then either Node 1 or one of its neighbors sends
Voting_Request (node 1) messages to all the neighbor nodes of Node 1.
• All neighbor nodes have Node 1 's agent residing locally, within each and every
neighbor node. So, finally, every neighbor node has the following information:
All (new), Al2, A13, A14. Because our policy is global, every node can locally
calculate the voting decision in identical manner, according to some generalized
threshold condition. If only a minority of the nodes vote in favor of Node 1
being malicious, then Node 1 is benign. If a majority of the nodes vote for the
node as malicious, Node 1 is deemed malicious, and steps should be taken to
isolate it from the network. If it is a tie, then repeat updating the nodes in this
neighborhood with period T2 (T2<T1) until a lowest-period threshold is reached
or until the tie is broken. After the period threshold is reached, still with a tie,
classify Node 1 as malicious.
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2.5 MANS Enforcement
Law L of policy P determines that treatment of p-messages is defined by specifying what
should be done when such a message is sent, and when it arrives.
Figure 2.3 Enforcement of MANS.
Furthermore, the law L is constructed as a pair <R, CS>, where R is a fixed global
set of rules defined for security recovery policy, and CS is a mutable set called control
states. Each node must be in one of the control states. The main role of control states is to
enable L to distinguish between different kinds of members, so that the ruling of the law
for a given event may depend on its home. In our recovery policy, we define control
states as levels of security: SecCon1 means the node is benign, SecCon3 means the node
is compromised, while SecCon2 means the node is suspicious.
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Our Security recovery policy P = <L, M, G, N, MN> is enforced as follows: there
is a controller associated with each node of group G, logically placed between the node
and the communications medium, and linked with other modules such as the
Authentication Module,
IDS agent, routing Module, Neighborhood Module, and so on. All controllers
have identical copies of the global set of rules R, and each controller maintains the
control states of the nodes under its jurisdiction. As discussed in the above section, every
controlled-event associated with a P-Message, that occurs at a given node x of the
MANET, is intercepted by the controller of x. The controller will undertake an operation
of that event according to the ruling and the current control state. Because all controllers
have identical copies of the law, the law is said to be global to the whole network. It is
noted that each controller, in fact, only controls the messaging, while specific operations
about security recovery are implemented by other modules. In other words, the main
function of the controller is to intercept messages received from controllers in other
nodes, to generate new messages needed or to forward messages to the right modules
according to the embedded identical rule R. The enforcement is shown schematically in
Figure 2.3.
2.6 Experimental Results
In this section, we present experimental results of simulation experiments to show how
security recovery policy, described in Section II, works and to investigate its
performance. Network Simulator 2 (NS2) was used as the simulation tool.
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2.6.1 Topology
The topology has 670m-to-670m width-to-length ratio for the rectangular box
constraining node movement. The chosen traffic patterns were generally a set of low rate,
long-lived, constant bit rate connections between randomly chosen source-destination
pairs. Each run contained 50 nodes with maximum transmission radii of 250m, creating a
densely connected topology, which never partitioned during any of the simulations. Node
movement rates were varied from static to highly mobile.
2.6.2 Neighborhood Management
There are two ways to generate the neighborhood of each node. First, we may get the
neighborhood directly from the MAC layer, assuming that the neighborhood can be
found out well in the simulation. The second way is to generate the neighborhood from
the routing table. Doing the latter, the neighborhood nodes that can be generated are
limited by the active nodes at hand (i.e., the traffic script that we are using).
Output from the MAC layer: Generally, each node has on average 10-20 neighbor
nodes that are 1-hop away, and about 20 neighbor nodes 2 hops away.
Outputs from the routing table: Getting neighbor nodes from the routing table is
an effective method in practice. For example, using the DSR routing protocol, each time
when a node has a packet to send, the DSR routing protocol needs to calculate the current
path to that destination. The next hop in this routing path is one of the neighbor nodes.
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2.6.3 IDS Models
In our security recovery system, it is assumed an IDS is installed in each node, which can
monitor the behavior of host nodes and neighbor nodes. In order to define our IDS model,
we first define the following parameters:
PRIOR: the prior probability of each node to be attacked and compromised
FN: Total number of undetected attacks/Total number of true positives (attacks)
TN: Total number of correct normal instances/Total number of normal=1-FP
FP: Total number of incorrect normal instances/Total number of normal
TP: Total number of correctly detected attacks/Total number of true positives
(attacks) =1-FN
FP R: FP output of the recovery system
TP_R: TP output of the recovery system
In other words, FP, FN, TP and TN stand for False Positive, False Negative, True
Positive and True Negative rates, respectively.
The IDS model we are using in this simulation is defined by seven levels:
Namely, FP=0.002, 0.005, 0.01, 0.02, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2; and correspondingly TP=0.2, 0.3,
0.4,0.5, 0.6,0.7, 0.8, where the low FP is paired up with a low TP rate (i.e., high FN) rate.
In other words, (FP=0.002, TP=0.2), (FP=0.005, TP=0.3) .... (FP=0.2, TP=0.8), are the
seven operational states of this particular IDS model.
2.6.4 Simulation Scenarios
Next, we assume that the host IDS and neighborhood IDSs are operating independently.
That means, the neighborhood IDSs will judge the target nodes by factors they observe
by themselves (such as the target's traffic variation, routing updating, and so on), as well
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as on reports from the target of summary raw information. We also assume, when voting,
that we treat reports from the host IDS or from neighborhood nodes exactly the same, in
other words all carry the same weights in contributing to the decision.
When we are simulating IDS Agents, each node would be randomly chosen to be
under attack or not (by the PRIOR probability value), while during the detection stage, its
own IDS and the neighborhood IDS would randomly correctly or incorrectly (in the case
of a normal condition, by the FP probability; in the case of an attack, by the TP
probability) report its own anomaly state. This is our first scenario, IDS scenario 1, in
which case the host IDS will not deliberately lie to report its state.
We also consider the second scenario, that of a lying compromised node: if a
node, say node 7, is under attack, its own IDS should have shown positive (attack),
however it reports to its neighborhood node members negative (that is it lies saying it is
not under attack). The question then becomes, if a node is compromised but lies about its
condition, what is the probability that the neighborhood will report the truth (that node 7
is under attack and has been compromised, despite the lie of node 7), and what is the
probability that the neighborhood will report negatively (that node 7 is not under attack,
thus being fooled by the lie of node 7).
Thus, in IDS scenario 2, we discuss the results received of simulation
experiments operating under the second scenario. Here the false negative is a deliberate
lie instead of a random choice, as it was in the first scenario. The probability of the lie
being discovered by the neighborhood was computed.
MANET networks may operate in a hostile environment, where the adversary
who compromised a node will deliberately cheat the other normal nodes in order to avoid
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detection. Thus, the host IDS on each node cannot be trusted. In this case, our LCG-based
recovery policy is necessary, and in IDS scenario 2, we discuss its performance.
2.6.4.1 IDS Scenario 1. 	 In this scenario, the host IDS honestly reports the results of
its decision, which is randomly controlled by TP and FP. The results are shown as Figure
2.4.
Figure 2.4 ROC curve in Scenariol.
From Figures 2.4, we could see that the larger the neighborhood number, the
better the performance will be. When N=8, the detection rate reaches 0.99 while false
alarm rate is 0.01(whereas the original detection rate is 0.8 and the false alarm is 0.2).
Moreover, the performance is slightly better when N (the total number of
neighborhood nodes and host) is even than odd. For example, the performance when N=2
is better than that of N=3, the performance when N=4 is better than that of N=5, and so
on. That is because of our chosen method of dealing with a tie when voting. Especially,
the performance when N=2 is noticeably good because a tie in this case occurs very
frequently. When N increases, the influence of a tie decreases, the performance
difference between a sizeable even and next odd number of nodes (say, 10 and 11 nodes)
decreases.
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2.6.4.2 IDS Scenario 2. 	 In this scenario, the compromised host will lie to its
neighbors, falsely reporting no attack, when in fact there is one.
From Figure 2.5, 2.6, we could see that in this scenario the host IDS cannot be
trusted: the detection rate is always 0 even when the original IDS is working efficiently.
When N=3, the recovered ROC curve is under the original IDS curve, that means the
performance is not be improved here either.
Figure 2.5 ROC curves in Scenario 2.
Figure 2.6 Comparison between Scenario 1 and 2.
When N is larger than 4, the recovery policy works better than the original IDS.
When N=8, the recovered neighborhood detection rate reaches 0.969 while false positive
alarm rate is 0.0113 (when the TP and FP of the node IDS is 0.8 and 0.2). Because when
a node is attacked, it will deliberately lie, this also means that the probability of detecting
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a lie is 0.969 with a false alarm rate of 0.011; the corresponding values, when the
attacked node does not lie, are 0.990 and 0.0107. This is an encouraging result.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter presents the architecture of the Mobile Ad-hoc Network Security
(MANS), a novel system that provides security to Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs)
and investigates its effectiveness. MANS is based on a "neighborhood watch" concept. It
builds a fully decentralized scalable security policy that is Law-Governed globally using
only local actions. MANS formally prescribes a Local Collaborative Group function by
defining neighborhoods, their states, and neighborhood-wide majority voting decisions. It
utilizes these concepts in developing the security recovery policy, including specification,
implementation, and enforcement.
MANS has been tested successfully with simulation experiments; the results
presented here cover the case of an attacked but honest node as well as that of a
compromised dishonest node. In both cases, it is shown that MANS identifies the
attacked and /or compromised node, requiring only a modest size neighborhood to
accomplish it.
CHAPTER 3
LOCALLY-ENFORCED GLOBAL TRUST AUTHENTICATION SCHEME
3.1 Introduction
Confidentiality, authentication, integrity, non-repudiation, access contro1 and availability
are considered as the main services of a security system. Among these services
authentication is probably the most important security service required to achieve other
services. There are various means to provide authentication, however, cryptography is
one of the most widely deployed and most effective way of providing this service. When
the subject of cryptography is touched even slightly, management of cryptographic keys
becomes an issue. The primary question any key management system tries to solve is -
`How do you trust that a key is authentic enough to use?' The bottom line is that a key
management system must ensure a user that a key it receives is authentic and it can use
this key for cryptographic purpose. From this point of view key management can be
considered a synonym of trust and security in the whole system.
This dissertation designs a scalable, robust, strong authentication infrastructure
which fits the requirements of specific mobile ad-hoc networks: 1) whose node number is
extensible to up to thousands; 2) whose nodes maybe deployed in hostile environment,
has high security concern; 3) whose nodes have significant computation power. None of
related works about authentication for MANET [6, 11, 16, 17, 25], etc. fits all this
requirements and conditions at the same time. We will discuss in more details in this
paper.
The security architecture in MANET is proposed in chapter 2, which includes
modules such as routing, authentication, IDS and so on. In this chapter, we describe a
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novel authentication paradigm and algorithm, called Locally-Enforced Global Trust
(LEGT), for high-value transactions in mobile ad hoc networks (MANET). Our work is
based on these requirements of scalability, robustness, strong security, motivated by and
grounded in previous research work accomplishments that include threshold
cryptography and cluster-based routing and communications in ad hoc networks. We
provision and support authentication services by adopting and adapting certificate-based
approaches. We are using threshold sharing [12,31] of the certificate signing key (or
"space diffusion") within each cluster to distribute the certificate services, and employing
trusted dealer only at the initialization stage (bootstrapping) for the purpose of global
trust.
To enhance the security of our scheme, we have adopted, adapted, and improved
the salient aspects of proactive security [21, 22], and publicly verifiable secret sharing
[23] security schemes. "Proactive security" is applied and embodied in out LEGT system
to provide enhanced protection against a mobile adversary to long-lived cryptographic
keys that are already distributed (i.e., protected by "space diffusion"). In fact it adds
protection by "time diffusion" as well. Namely, given a shared function as described
above, it adds a periodic refreshing of the contents of the distributed shareholder.
Therefore, the knowledge of the mobile adversary obtained in the past from
compromising at most the allowed k-1 numbers of shares is rendered useless for the
future. Verifiable secret sharing is also applied to publicly verify the correctness of
received secret share updating. Besides allowing us proactivization and allowing us to
securely change a threshold sharing scheme by changing the threshold parameter (from
t-out-of-/ to t-out-of-t and vice versa), they allow us to change t and 1 dynamically as a
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system management tool. Here t is the threshold number of nodes that an adversary must
corrupt in order to succeed, while / is the total number of nodes that may comprise the
network infrastructure and support the network communications.
In this chapter, an example of the adoption of the general design of the Cluster
Based Routing Protocol, (CBRP), which is one of the IEFT's candidates for a MANET
routing protoco1 standard, is also presented. We have implemented our algorithm in our
state-of-the-art MANET scalable emulation testbed (MASE), and performed evaluations
such like in the MANET environment.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section II presents related works.
Section III discusses architecture of our proposed algorithm LEGT. Section IV presents
embedding Proactive Secret Sharing / verifiable secret sharing in our LEGT design.
Section V presents cluter_based authentication and certificate renewal/revocation.
Section VI discusses the implementation and evaluation of our design in networks
applying CBRP as routing protocol. Section VII evaluates our model in means of security
enhancement, computational and network requirements. Section VIII concludes the paper
with some important remarks that were due to the work being presented.
3.2 Related Works
Key management has become a synonym to authentication management. At the same
time, cryptosystem is a means of achieving a lot of security services, which, in turn, help
achieve several security objectives. In this section we concentrate on existing
authentication algorithms in an ad hoc network. Four published methods are discussed
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here. Some aspects of these methods, deemed useful in practice, have been adopted and
adapted in our scheme.
3.2.1 Certificate Chain
Self-organized PKI is a key distribution scheme proposed by the Terminodes [6] group.
This scheme is very similar to PGP as it employs meshed PKI architecture but the
certificates are distributed by the hosts themselves, not through a certificate directory as
in the case of PGP. This scheme requires each host to maintain a small database of
certificates selected using some algorithm. When a host wants to obtain the public key of
another host they merge their local certificate databases and try to find an appropriate
certificate chain to the other host from this merged database. This scheme provides a
probabilistic guarantee that the certificate chain will be found in the merged database.
3.2.2 Threshold Cryptography
Zhou and Haas in [11] suggest using threshold cryptography as the means of distributing
trust in ad hoc networks. In [17], Lu and Luo extended above threshold cryptography
way. They present an authentication service whereby the public-key certificate of each
node is cooperatively generated by a set of neighbors based on the behavior of the node
as monitored by the neighbors. Using a group signature mechanism based on polynomial
secret sharing, the secret digital signature key used to generate public-key certificates is
distributed among several nodes. Certification services like issuing, renewal and
revocation of certificates are distributed among the nodes: a single node holds just a share
of the complete certificate signature key. The authors propose a localized trust model to
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characterize the localized nature of security concerns in large ad hoc wireless networks.
When applying such trust model, an entity is trusted if any k trusted entities claim so:
these k trusted entities are typically the neighboring nodes of the entity. A locally trusted
entity is globally accepted and a locally distrusted entity is regarded untrustworthy all
over the network. Certificate issuing/renewal, revocation, secret share initialization are
also defined in [17].
3.2.3 Direct and Recommendation Trust
In [16], authors present a Light-Weight Authentication Model which is strongly based on
human behavior when dealing with trust since the human society itself can be seen as an
ad-hoc network. This model is similar to Distributed Trust Model [27] to establish trust
relationships and extend it by a request for references. Each entity maintains a repository
of trustworthy entities such that a path between two arbitrary entities can be found by
indirectly using the repositories of other entities. Distributed Trust Model [27] is a
decentralized approach to trust management and uses a recommendation protocol to
exchange trust-related information. The model assumes that trust relationships are
unidirectional and taking place between two entities. The entities make judgments about
the quality of a recommendation based on their policies, i.e., they have values for trust
relationships. Also trust is not absolute, e.g. an entity can change the trust value it
received as a recommendation. The policy is not communicated, so it might not be
understandable for other entities, which prevents it from being misused. The
recommendation protocol works by requesting a trust value in a trust target with respect
to a particular classification. After getting an answer an evaluation function is used to
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obtain an overall trust value in the target. The protocol also allows recommendation
refreshing and revocation. To do so the recommender sends the same recommendation
with another recommendation value, or a neutral value to revoke. The model is suited to
establishing trust relationships that are less formal, temporary, or targeting ad-hoc
commercial transactions.
3.2.4 Cluster Based Key Management
In [25], authors introduce an end-to-end data authentication scheme where authors have
attempted to minimize the encryption so that computational complexity is kept low.
Detailed steps for countering repetition based attacks can be found in [25]. For
authentication only, each node is given a system public key and system private key when
it joins the network. This pair of keys is shared by all the nodes of the network. Besides
the system key, each node also needs a cluster key. This cluster key is unique to every
cluster and a single cluster key is shared by all the nodes belonging to a cluster. This key
is generated by the cluster head and distributed to all the cluster members. This key is
encrypted with the system public key and broadcast by the head. Each cluster head also
has a unique pair of public/private key called head key. This private key is known only to
the head that generates it. The corresponding public key is known to all the network
nodes. This is done by means of a network wide broadcast that is initiated by each head
immediately after it gets elected as the leader.
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3.3 Architecture of LEGT
This work is motivated by and grounded in the related works, briefly described above,
which have their own pros and cons or suitability in different environments (large or
small networks, expensive or inexpensive transactions, highly requirement on security or
not, as so on). At the same time, we have examined and employ cluster-based routing and
communications; such methods have been found effective in large, scalable networks,
and have been devised to minimize the overhead of flooding of route discovery packets in
the whole network. As mentioned, our algorithm is called Locally-Enforced Global Trust
(LEGT). We provide an authentication service by taking a certificate -based approach.
We are using threshold sharing of the certificate signing key within each cluster to
distribute the authentication service (Locally-Enforced), and employing the trust
authority only at initialization stage to achieve authentication between clusters (Global
Trust). Certificate services, key sharing functions and cluster membership control are also
defined in our algorithm.
Since the authentication strategy presented here is for a hierarchical architecture, a
cluster-based network has been used. We have therefore discussed clustering in the next
subsection. Then we compare our algorithm with other related works and then outline the
basic ideas of our Locally-Enforced Global Trust. Our assumptions, design criteria, and
detailed strategy have been put forth in the subsequent sections.
3.3.1 Overview of the Cluster-based Approach
The cluster-based architecture was devised to minimize the flooding of route discovery
packets. One of routing protocols that use this hierarchic architecture is the Cluster Based
Routing Protocol, CBRP [24]. This kind of architecture is most suitable for large
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networks with many nodes. The entire network is divided into a number of either
overlapping or disjoint 2-hop-diameter clusters as shown in Figure 3.1. A cluster head is
elected for each cluster to maintain the cluster membership information. A cluster is
identified by its cluster Head ID. Each node in the network knows its Cluster Head(s) and
therefore knows which cluster(s) it belongs to (in the case of overlapping clusters, a node
could and often would belong to more than one cluster). A node regards itself as in
cluster X if it has a bi-directional link to the head of cluster X. In the current
implementation of CBRP, the node with the lower node ID is elected as the cluster head.
All the nodes broadcast HELLO messages periodically. The hello messages also contain
tables carrying information about the neighboring nodes and adjacent clusters. These
HELLO messages are useful for maintaining up-to-date 2-hop topology.
Figure 3.1 Example of a network divided into clusters; trust is enforced in each cluster;
Cluster Heads 1, 2 and 3 (CH1, CH2, CH3) use and support certificate chains.
An in-depth study of Cluster Based Networks has been made [24]. We however
focus on devising and studying the authentication scheme that is most optimal for such
hierarchical architectures. In implementation of our authentication scheme, we will show
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how to piggyback our authentication information to the routing message (such as HELLO
message) if possible.
3.3.2 Comparison with Other Schemes
The self-organized PKI presented in [6] is scalable to large networks according to the
"small world" theory, with high probabilistic guarantee that the certificate chain will be
found in the merged short local repository. But, the authenticity of the certificate obtained
by this scheme relies on the assumption that trust on a user's authenticity of its certificate
means also trust of this user's authenticity of issuing a certificate. This level of trust is
often questionable, and in doubt, especially in Ad hoc networks. Moreover, if even only
one of the users in the whole chain is misbehaving in issuing certificates, the whole chain
is affected, and the certificate merged by this chain is not authentic. It is expected that the
larger the network, the higher the risk. In [6], authors use an authentication metric to
represent the assurance with the authentic public key by using the chain of certificates.
But no active method of enhancing the authenticity of the resulting certificates is
implemented. Moreover, certificate renewal and revocation are left to be defined.
In our scheme, we employ the cluster-based technical approach; here all users in
one cluster can share one cluster key. So the total number of key are dramatically
reduced. Moreover, in our scheme, certificate renewal and revocation are specifically
defined.
Authors of [21] apply the "shared secret" to achieve "localized trust". Certificate
issuing/renewal, revocation, and secret share initialization are basically implemented
locally. However, this approach present here assures a locally trusted entity is globally
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accepted and a locally distrusted entity is regarded untrustworthy all over the network. A
very large, heterogeneous MANET may consist of users from different companies,
universities or troops with different functions, security levels and so on; in such settings it
is hard for a user to fully trust another user signed by a group of remote, never-heard-of
units; or in a military application, more than k nodes in one area may be compromised
and all certificates jointly signed by these nodes are no longer authentic. Moreover, this
scheme distributed system secret key through the whole network, making security
services such as, secret sharing verification and updating not scalable.
In our scheme, the secret shares distribution, verification, certificate renewal, and
revocation are implemented within each cluster, which enforces that every user who gets
a valid certificate or signature is truly locally entrusted. When authenticating a user from
a different cluster, a cluster certificate which is signed at initialization stage will be used
to check the authenticity of the cluster to which this user belongs. At the same time, our
scheme is highly scalable implemented with cluster routing protocol (in this paper,
CBRP).
In [25], authors introduce an end-to-end data authentication scheme where authors
have attempted to minimize the encryption so that computational complexity is kept low.
Detailed steps for countering repetition based attacks can be found in [21]. For
authentication only, each node is given a system public key and system private key when
it joins the network. This pair of keys is shared by all the nodes of the network. Besides
the system key, each node also needs a cluster key. This cluster key is unique to every
cluster and a single cluster key is shared by all the nodes belonging to a cluster. This key
is generated by the cluster head and distributed to all the cluster members. This key is
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encrypted with the system public key and broadcast by the head. Each cluster head also
has a unique pair of public/private key called head key. This private key is known only to
the head that generates it. The corresponding public key is known to all the network
nodes. This is done by means of a network wide broadcast that is initiated by each head
immediately after it gets elected as the leader. In this scheme, system public key and
system private key are used for mutual authentication and Cluster Heads are used as CAs.
Use of the system public key and system private key needs "bootstrap" from some
authorities.
Two problems about employing the Cluster Heads as CAs need to be addressed:
firstly, authors assume all the nodes of the network mutually trust each other, so public
keys are just broadcast through the network without any binding of public keys and IDs
(such as certificates); secondly, because a Cluster Head is used as CA for the whole
cluster, if the Cluster Head is attacked, the whole cluster fails.
In our scheme, we also use the cluster-based approach, but we are also using
certificates for binding a cluster's ID and a cluster's public key, as well as threshold
cryptography for fault tolerance, which is crucial in high-value MANET networks.
3.3.3 Assumptions for LEGT:
• For high-value transactions or military applications
• Nodes with significant computing power
• During any time interval between certificate updating, the adversary cannot
break or control k or more nodes in each group.
• Each node i has a unique nonzero ID Vi, such as its IP address.
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• Each node has some one-hop neighborhood discovery mechanism or group
membership management, which are provided by underlying routing protocol.
• Communication between one-hop neighboring nodes is more reliable compared
with multi-hop packet forwarding, since the exposure to wireless channel error
and interference is limited and no ad hoc routing is involved.
• Each node has at least k one-hop legitimate neighboring nodes, where k and n
are locally decided by local group and transparent to other groups.
• Each node is equipped with some detection mechanism to identify misbehaving
nodes among its one-hop neighborhood.
3.3.4 The Locally-Enforced Global Trust (LEGT) Paradigm
We present here the distinctive and advantageous aspects of the Locally-Enforced Global
Trust (LEGT) authentication service. As mentioned, our scheme is motivated by and
grounded in the above three schemes but employs, improves and integrates their
advantageous aspects while avoiding their drawbacks. In our scheme, we still use secret
sharing, but in a way different than in [17] where authors distribute the global private key
SK that is used to sign certificates into each node of the network by a polynomial of order
k-1. Here, our MANETs are composed of clusters or groups. These clusters or groups
maybe just neighborhood nodes, maybe clusters when using hierarchical routing protocol
such as CBRP or ZRP. In practice, they could be different organizational components or
troop groupings: Each group or cluster has a specific group key pair; a threshold scheme
<k, n> is used within the group to support a multi-signature scheme or certificates for
nodes in this group. Within each group, we have two options:
• Each node has his own key pair and a threshold scheme <k, n> is used to co-sign
the certificates;
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• Each group has only one common public key (in order to reduce the size of the
public key directory), instead of each node in the group having a key, and any
subset of k individuals can sign and thus generate a valid signature.
We use the multi-signature scheme presented in [20] in an essential way. Each
individual has to get a signature or certificate from the group she belongs to before she
can mutually authenticate with any other individual in other groups, while the
authenticity of group key pairs are certified through a trusted third party in initial
(bootstrapping) phase. Compared with [6], which greatly increases certificate path length
and the size of local certificate repositories when network size increasing, we reduce the
security risk and computation resources which makes our scheme more scalable. At the
same time, we enhance the security compared with [17] because certificates are signed
locally within each cluster and other clusters check the authenticity of a cluster before
checking the node's certificate signed by it. Certificate renewal and/or revocation are
implemented locally.
LEGT scheme is outlined as follows:
• LEGT is using the RSA-based schemes to generate the private and public key
pairs, which are used for end-to-end security to realize cipher key exchange,
message privacy, non-repudiation, and most importantly in our scheme, for
authentication. Since RSA is slow and costly, we are using AES for block
encryption and decryption after a security channel has been set up and the AES
key has been distributed through the RSA scheme.
• A Trusted Authority (TA) is needed only the initialization stage (bootstrapping).
TA generates its system public key/system private key. System public key is
broadcasted to each node while the bootstrapping and system private key is kept
secretly by TA.
• For the initial authentication of new clusters and for judging their
trustworthiness for other clusters which hasn't trust relationship with each other,
TA signs cluster certificate for every cluster public key. While corresponding
cluster private key is shared by all the nodes belonging to that cluster by
Shamir's scheme [12];
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• Certificate for each node is issued/renewed locally — by other neighbor nodes or
within the cluster (according to the routing protocol the network is using) The
new certificates or updating certificates must be "locally trusted" through
threshold cryptography ;
• When a user of one cluster (say, Clusterl) wants to mutually authenticate with a
user of another cluster (Cluster3), first they show each other the certificates or
signature signed by their cluster. Then Cluster certificate will be checked to trust
each other's group.
• A user who cannot be trusted by his neighborhood or cluster cannot get a
certificate or signature of his cluster, which means he cannot get trust anywhere
in the whole network; When a cluster fails to show valid cluster certificate
signed by TA at the first time communication or its certificate expired or
revoked, all nodes in such cluster cannot be trusted anywhere throughout the
whole network.
• To enhance the security of our scheme, we are also using the salient aspects of
the following security schemes: certificate renewal/revocation, proactive secret
sharing [21], [22], and publicly verifiable secret sharing [23].
In the following two sections, we define our Locally-Enforced Global Trust
algorithm in further detail. We first define the different key types that are used and the
method adopted for the distribution of these keys. Then, we describe secret share dealing
(including sharing, verification and updating), membership management, certificate
services, certificate repositories construction, and last, authentication steps.
3.4 Proactive, Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing in LEGT
The mobile hosts in MANETs can be physically captured and compromised. Therefore,
the authentication architecture should avoid having any central entity of control, so that
compromise of any one (or in fact several) entity does not risk the whole network. Thus,
the fundamental philosophy of approach for security in our system, the LEGT, is to rely
on local, cluster-based, provisioning and maintenance of security functions, and in
particular of authentication and trust. In other words, it is expected that resilience against
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compromised nodes can be achieved by distributing the functionality of the centralized
certificate authority (CA) servers among a group of servers or nodes.
There are several recent works on security in wireless networks. Some propose a
Kerberos-based authentication scheme for mobile users in wireless cellular networks.
Others directly apply the threshold secret sharing and proactive secret share update
techniques in a group of "special nodes" to increase service availability and robustness.
Instead of following the conventional client-server model, we suggest a peer-to-peer
approach to maximize availability and facilitate localized communication.
Distribution of security functions has been a very active research area in the
literature; of particular interest is security function sharing, where threshold secret
sharing serves as a basic primitive. The focus of these works has been to maximize the
security of the shared secret in the presence of possible compromises of the secret share
holders.
Our scheme is motivated by these works, but extends the idea further in an
attempt to minimize the effort and complexity for mobile clients to locate and contact the
service providers. We devise scalable algorithms and protocols to enable the distribution
of the certification services into every node. There is no differentiation of servers and
clients any more, in our architecture: a threshold number of any nodes can collaboratively
act as servers to provide services for other nodes.
The underlying techniques we design are fundamentally "share of shares"
methods which change the representation of a function. Proactive secret sharing can
further improve robustness via periodic secret share updates. To enhance the security of
our scheme, i.e., the LEGT, we have adopted, adapted, and improved the salient aspects
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of proactive security [21, 22], and publicly verifiable secret sharing [33,34] security
schemes. Besides allowing us proactivization and allowing us to securely change a
threshold sharing scheme by changing the threshold parameter (from t-out-of-/ to t-out-
of-t and vice versa), they allow us to change t and 1 dynamically as a system
management tool. Here t is the threshold number of nodes that an adversary must corrupt
in order to succeed, while / is the total number of nodes that may comprise the network
infrastructure and support the network communications.
3.4.1 Background, Definitions, and Descriptions
3.4.1.1 The RSA Algorithm. The RSA [32] function is a building block for many se-
cure systems where the adversary is allowed to initially access the system and get results
based on various restrictions on the input (i.e., chosen plaintext encryption, random
plaintext to be signed, etc.). Secure systems typically allow access to random instances
(i.e., allowing sampling RSA as a one-way function), thus we assume here that allowed
inputs are random.
The RSA key generator G produces two large random primes p=2 p' +1 and
q=2 q' +1 ( p' , q' are primes), and computes n = pq, Euler function (I) (n) = (p -1) . (q -1)
and λ(n)=2 p' q' . To compute the secret key, the generator chooses a random d such
that the gcd (d, 4(n)) = 1. The public key is n and e where ed= 1 mod 4:4(n).
The one-way (hard) direction of RSA (used in decryption or signature of a
message m) is S„, and
 mod n, whereas the public (easy) direction (used in encryptions
and verification of signature) is (S m)e mod n which gives m.
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3.4.1.2 Threshold Cryptography. Threshold cryptography (also called "space
diffusion") provides for increased availability of authentication, especially important in
MANETs where nodes may operate in a hostile environment. Threshold cryptography, in
particular public-key function sharing, embodies the concept of secret sharing [19, 20]
(where a shared secret is recoverable only from a threshold of shareholders). It provides
for increased availability of the function service (signature, decryption, etc.) by
distributing fk(.) to a set of 1 nodes such that for any valid argument m, any set of at least
a given threshold of the nodes can compute fk(m). For security, on the other hand, an
adversary who controls less than a given threshold t of nodes and can hear all of the
public messages, obtains no computational advantage in computing fk(m') for a target
message m' as compared to an adversary attacking the centralized function fk (.) with the
same capabilities. Thus the function is protected by "space diffusion" since an attacker is
forced to break the memory of more than a threshold of the function share-holders.
3.4.1.3 Publicly Verified Secret Sharing. Basic threshold secret sharing solves the
problem for the case that all players in the scheme are honest [19, 20].However, if a
player or some players are dishonest, basic secret sharing schemes will not be in practice
because of the following reasons: (i) all participants can not verify validity of their shares
from the dealer in the distribution protocol, and (ii) participant can not check validity of
their shares from other participants in the reconstruction protocol. In order to resist
malicious players, Feldman [23] and Pedersen [39] constructed a new type secret sharing
scheme respectively. They are called verifiable secret sharing (VSS) schemes in which
the following cases are ture (i) the dealer cannot send invalid shares to some or all of the
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participants during the distribution protocol, and (ii)participants cannot submit invalid
shares during the reconstruction protocol.
There are two drawbacks in some cases: (i) the participants can only verify their
own share, but anybody can not verify that the participants received correct shares. (ii)
the participants simply release their shares in the reconstruction protocol, subsequently
the released shares may be verified by anybody against the output ofthe distribution
protocol.
In order to deal with them, publicly verifiable secret sharing (PVSS) schemes
were proposed by Stadler [34] and Schoenmakers [35] respectively. A publicly verifiable
secret sharing (PVSS) scheme is a verifiable secret sharing scheme with the property that
the validity of the shares distributed by the dealer can be verified by any party; hence
verification is not limited to the respective participants receiving the shares. Authors in
[35] present a new construction for PVSS schemes, which compared to previous
solutions by Stadler and later by Fujisaki and Okamoto, achieves improvements both in
efficiency and in the type of intractability assumptions. The running time is O(nk), where
k is a security parameter, and n is the number of participants, hence essentially optimal.
The intractability assumptions are the standard Diffie-Hellman assumption and its
decisional variant.
3.4.1.4 Proactive Security. "Proactive security" provides enhanced protection against a
"mobile adversary" to long-lived cryptographic keys that are already distributed, i.e.,
protected by threshold cryptography or "space diffusion"; it adds protection by
incorporating "time diffusion" as well.
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Proactive security (introduced in [21]) employs dynamic memory refreshing
activated by the nodes and servers to withstand a "mobile adversary." Proactive robust
threshold public-key schemes (introduced in [22]) have been designed for and applied to
general "homomorphic-type" public-key systems. These systems are optimal-resilience,
namely the (arbitrary) adversary can corrupt any minority of servers at any time-period;
this threshold is a (trivial) upper bound on resilience, even against a weaker stationary
adversary. The techniques here give general optimal-resilience public-key systems, which
are "robust threshold" schemes (assuming a stationary adversary), and extensions which
give proactive" systems.
As mentioned, "proactive security" provides enhanced protection against a mobile
adversary to long-lived cryptographic keys that are already distributed (i.e., protected by
"space diffusion."). In fact, it adds protection by "time diffusion" as well. Namely, given
a shared function, as described above, it adds a periodic refreshing of the contents of the
distributed nodes' memories. This proactive refreshing protocol causes a "t-wise re-
randomization" of the local nodes' values which preserves the global key but makes
previous contents of any set of less than t out of the / nodes "useless". Therefore, the
knowledge of the mobile adversary (representing: hackers, viruses, bad administrators,
etc.) obtained in the past from compromising at most the allowed t-1 number of nodes is
rendered useless for the future (i.e., this gives the system a self securing nature). The
proactive systems for cryptographic functions inherit the availability property of
threshold schemes.
42
3.4.2 Adversary Models
For adversaries that attack the system by compromising Mobile Ad hoc nodes, we
assume that the underlying cryptographic primitives such as RSA are practically secure in
terms of the computation power of the attackers. However, we do allow occasional break-
ins through factors such as insecure OS, software bugs and backdoors etc. Several
adversaries may conspire into a group. For ease of presentation, we denote such an
adversary group by a single adversary.
We characterize the adversaries in the following two models:
Model I: During the entire lifetime of the MANET network, the adversary cannot
break or control t or more nodes.
In LEGT, we modify the RSA multi-signature algorithms based on threshold
secret sharing to handle the adversary of model I.
Model II: Assume time is divided into intervals of length T. During any time
interval, the adversary cannot break or control t or more nodes.
Although at any time constant it cannot break or control t. or more nodes, the
adversary of model II can choose its victims at each time interval. As time goes on each
node in the network can be broken during some time interval.
The adversary is computationally bounded and it can corrupt nodes at any
moment during a time period by viewing the memories of corrupted nodes and/or
modifying their behavior. The adversary likely bases its corruption decisions on past
available message signatures pairs. If a node is corrupted during an update phase, we
consider the node as corrupted during both periods adjacent to that update phase. We
assume that the adversary corrupts no more than t —1 out of 1 nodes in each time period,
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where I _2(t —1) + 1 (this (t —1)-restricted adversary guarantees the existence of a
majority of t honest nodes at each period). Our model does not differentiate malicious
faults from "normal" node failures (e.g., crashes). We assume that the adversary intruding
on a shareholder is "removable" (e.g., through a reboot procedure) when it is detected.
The reboot operation is performed immediately when attacks or deviations from the
protocol are detected, and it is shorter than a duration of a time period. We also consider
special weaker cases of this malicious (t —1)-restricted mobile adversary (static vs.
mobile, and passive vs. malicious).
3.4.3 The Distributed Defensive Posture: Distributed RSA
Based on discussion above, on the defense side, we employ methods similar to the
public-key model of [20]. We assume our group of / nodes securely shares cluster private
key k Cluster head is dealer with the property that all cluster members are instantly
connected to it. We assume that each node has a local source of randomness and that the
system is synchronized (and w.l.o.g. that nodes act synchronously). A proactive
implementation of the communication model is discussed in [21]. The time is divided
into time periods which are determined by the common global clock (e.g., a day, a week,
etc.). Each time period consists of a short update phase, during which the nodes engage
in an interactive update protocol, at the end of which they hold new shares (in fact, a new
sharing) of the secret k. After the update, there is a function computation phase, in which
the nodes perform the intended secret-key operation using their current sharing of k on
numerous inputs.
In summary, an optimal-robustness proactive RSA system we used here has the
following protocols: (1) an initialization protocol where shares are distributed,
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commitments are also broadcast for public verification; (2) RSA function (signature)
application protocol, where the nodes act on a common authorized input and then the
combining function generates the final RSA result efficiently; (3) an update phase
operation which contains a share renewal protocol and a share loss detection and
recovery protocol. We require correctness which means that at any point that a function
is needed to be evaluated there are enough honest nodes, so that the combination of their
shares gives the correct RSA result. We also require robustness so that the combining
effort even when up to t parties are adversarial is polynomial-time.
We present those protocols in the following sections.
3.4.4 Local Key Definitions and Distribution Methodology
Each node has its unique Node ID Vi. Node ID is a string that uniquely identifies a
particular mobile node. In CBRP, a node's IP address is used as its ID for purposes of
routing and interoperability with fixed networks. Each node has its own public/private
key pair <SKi, PKi>, where SKi denotes Vi's private key for decryption and signing, PKi
denotes Vi's public key fro encryption and verification. The private key SKi is only
possessed by node Vi to decrypt messages that are encrypted by the corresponding public
key PKi and to sign some messages to generate signature. The public key PKi is used for
other nodes to encrypt messages toward Vi, and to verify a signature that is supposed
signed by node Vi with its private key SKi. To save key space, each node may not need its
own public/private key pair and all members in the same cluster share the cluster
public/private key by means of multi-signature. The binding of private key SKi and node
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Vi is approached by certificates signed within each cluster by cluster private key
described as following.
A cluster consists of a group of nodes. Each cluster has a unique cluster ID Cm,
cluster private key C: =<d, n>, and cluster public key C pmk =<e, n>. Cluster private
key is shared by all members of this cluster to sign or update certificates of each member.
Each node gets her one share of cluster private key at bootstrap phase or during
networking operation, when she joins a cluster and issued by the joint of cluster member.
Threshold cryptography is used when signing multi-signatures or certificates within each
cluster, where parameters K and N are decided by each cluster according to their
membership and transparent to other clusters.
A Trusted Authority (TA) is needed only the initialization stage (bootstrapping).
TA generates system public key/system private key. System public key is broadcasted to
each node while the bootstrapping and system private key is kept secretly by TA.
3.4.5 Secret Share Assignment and Management
Node Vi gets its secret share of cluster private key share Pvi at the bootstrapping
phase of the network, or the first time it joins one cluster and issued by cluster member.
In initial phase, TA acts as secrete share dealer and certificate authority for each cluster.
3.4.5.1 Secret Sharing Distribution. Secret sharing distribution is implemented by
following steps:
Step 1: Each Cluster generates its RSA cluster private/public key pair
the RSA algorithm.
Step 2: TA choose a random polynomial f (x) of degree K-1,
Step 3: TA privately transmits each node Vi (i = 1, 2, 3,..., N) within cluster the
secret sharing
Lagrange interpolation is used by any K shareholders to regenerate the secret by
Instead of revealing the private exponent d to the coalition, the more secure way
is that the certificate requester broadcasts the messages m (here m is generally the hash of
message M) for signing, and each shareholder generates its partial certificate with its
secret share and sends it back to the requester. The requester can then combine K partial
signatures to generate the certificate.
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Figure 3.2 Secret share dealing within one cluster.
3.4.5.2 The Co-sign Phase. The co-sign phase is defined by following steps:
Step 1: The certificate requester Vi broadcasts its certificate issuing/update
request m within its cluster in the format of {Vi, PKi, Cm, Texpire}, which may read:
"node Vi from Cluster Cm is requesting a certificate of its personal public key as PKi
which will expire after Texpire".
Step 2: After receiving this request, each node Vj within cluster Cm may check
its transaction with Node Vi and decides whether to issue its partial certificate or not. If
yes, Vj computes the partial certificate cert = m' mod n and sends it back to Vi.
Step 3: The certificate requester Vi can collect K partial certificates to combine
its final certificate cert signed by the cluster private key Cis: :
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We show the above secret share dealing steps in Figure 3.2.
3.4.6 Add Public Verifiability
In the operation of above co-sign phase, if at least one of these K partial certificates is
faulty, the result certificate will be invalid. It may be from a broken node that is
controlled by the adversary to attack our protocols. It may also be a node that makes a
mistake. Therefore, we further add verifications to above secret sharing protocol, such as:
1) In distribution phase, all nodes can verify the validity of their shares from TA.
2) In co-sign phase, each node can verify validity of partial certificate from other
nodes, select k valid partial certificates to reconstruct certificate, discard invalid partial
certificates and put the nodes which come from to Certificate Revocation List.
3) During above two verifications, each node's partial share should not be
released.
3.4.6.1 Model for Non-interactive PVSS. We applied Publicly Verified Secret Sharing
(PVSS) as in [35]. As a common structure for PVSS schemes we need consider the
following steps. Note that initialization is done without any interaction between the TA
and the Nodes. In fact, Nodes may enter or leave the cluster dynamically; the only
requirement is that a node holds a registered public key.
The generic model for Non-interactive PVSS is described as following:
Initialization All system parameters, keys are generated as part of the
initialization. Furthermore, each Participant Pi registers her public key to be used with a
public key encryption method Ei. The actual set of participants taking part in a run of the
49
PVSS scheme must be a subset of the registered participants. We assume w.l.o.g. that
participants P1, . . . , Pn are the actual participants in the run described below.
Distribution The protocol consists of two steps:
1). Distribution of the shares. The distribution of a secret s is performed by the
dealer D. The dealer first generates the respective shares si for participant Pi, for i = 1, . .
. , n. For each participant Pi the dealer publishes the encrypted share Ei(si). The dealer
also publishes a string PROOFD to show that each Ei encrypts a share si. Furthermore,
the string PROOFD commits the dealer to the value of secret s, and it guarantees that the
reconstruction protocol will result in the same value s.
2). Verification of the shares. Any party knowing the public keys for the
encryption methods Ei may verify the shares. For each participant Pi a non-interactive
verification algorithm can be run on PROOFD to verify that Ei(si) is a correct encryption
of a share for Pi. Since anyone may verify a share, it may be ruled out that a participant
complains while it received a correct share. In case one or more verifications fail, we
therefore say that the dealer fails, and the protocol is aborted. (If some level of fault-
tolerance is desired one may continue and think of it as a (t, n — c)-threshold scheme,
where c is the number of verifications that failed.)
Reconstruction The protocol consists of two steps:
1). Decryption of the shares. The participants decrypt their shares si from Ei(si). It
is not required that all participants succeed in doing so, as long as a qualified set of
participants is successful. These participants release si plus a string PROOFPi that shows
that the released share is correct.
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2). Pooling the shares. The strings PROOFPi are used to exclude the participants
which are dishonest or fail to reproduce their share si correctly. Reconstruction of the
secret s can be done from the shares of any qualified set of participants.
3.4.6.2 Special PVSS Scheme in LEGT. Let Gq denote a group of prime order q, such
that computing discrete logarithms in this group is infeasible. Let g, G denotes
independently selected generators of G, q, hence no party knows the discrete log of g
with respect to G.
We will use the protocol by Chaum and Pedersen [29] as a subprotocol to prove
that logo hi =logg2 h2 , for generators g1, hl, g2, h2 E Gq. We denote this protocol by
DLEQ (g1, hl, g2, h2), and it consists of the following steps, where the prover knows a
such that h1= g1a and h2 = g2 a :
1). The prover sends al = g1w and a2 = g 2 w to the verifier, with WE Zq.
2). The verifier sends a random challenge CE Zq to the prover.
3). The prover responds with r = w — ac (mod q).
4). The verifier checks that al = g1rh1c , a2= g2 r h2 c
We modified secret sharing protocol described in section 2.4.5 as following:
Initialization Gq and the generators g is selected using an appropriate public
procedure by TA. Cluster key pair <e,d> is also generated. Each node Pi generates a
private key SKi and broadcasts PKi.
Distribution The protocol consists of two steps:
1). Distribution of the shares. Suppose w.l.o.g. that the TA wishes to distribute the
cluster secret key among participants P1, . . . , Pn. The TA picks a random polynomial f
of degree at most K — 1 with coefficients in Zq:
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The TA keeps this polynomial secret but publishes the related commitments
aj
•C = g , for 0	 < k. The TA also publishes the witness of each node's partial secret
Xi, as Xi
 = g Pi , for 1 5.i it Finally, TA sends p(i) to each node privately or encrypt
by nodes' public keys.
2). Verification of the shares. Any node computes
< k, 1 .5.i	 from the Cj values and verify witness of secrete share as Xi= gP(i) . By
doing so, any node can verify that TA didn't send invalid shares to some or all of the
nodes during distribution phase.
Reconstruction The protoco1 consists of two steps:
Step1: The certificate requester Vi broadcasts its certificate issuing/update
request message m within its cluster in the format of {Vi, PKi, Cm, Texpire}, which may
read: "node Vi from Cluster Cm is requesting a certificate of its personal public key as
PKi which will expire after Texpire" .
Step2: After receiving this request, each node Vj within cluster Cm may check its
transaction with Node Vi and decides whether to issue its partial certificate or not. If yes,
Vj computes the partial certificate certj mpj mod n and sends it back to Vi. As in
discussed in distribution phase, the witness of node j's share p(j) , Xj= gP(j) is already
published. The serving node Vj shows that the partial signature is consistent by producing
a proof of knowledge of the unique p(i), 1 S i 5.n, satisfying:
52
Equivalent problem is to follow DLEQ(g, Xj , m, CERTj) to proof that
logcert CERTj = log g Xj . The non-interactive proof is the n-fold parallel composition of
the protocols for DLEQ (g, Xj , m, CERTj ). Applying Fiat-Shamir's technique, the
challenge c for the protocol is computed as a cryptographic hash of Xj , CERTj, al = grw ,
a2 = mw , where w is randomly chosen. Serving node Vj calculate c=HASH( Xj , CERTj,
al , a2) and response r = w— cp(j) then signs {al ,a2,0 as proof to Vi.
Step3: Pooling the shares. When node Vi receives the signed {al,a2,r}, it
calculates c=HASH( Xj , CERTj, al , a2) and verifies if al = grXjc , a2= mrCERTjc.
Node Vi believes that the partial certificate CERTj is valid if both above equations hold.
Otherwise Vi believes that Vj is misbehaving or broken. It may further mark Vj in its
CRL and send out and accusation.
Suppose w.l.o.g. that node i produce correct values for CERTj after verification,
for j = 1, . . . , K. The cert is combined as:
Note that the nodes do not need nor learn the values of the exponents p(i). Only
the related values certi are required to complete the reconstruction of the certificate.
Also, note that Node Pi does not expose its private key SKi; consequently node Pi can
use its key pair in several runs of the PVSS scheme.
3.4.7 Proactive Secret Share Update — An Implementation
To further defend the polynomial secret sharing against the model II adversaries,
Herzberg [25] et al. proposed periodical secret share updates with different
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polynomials. We employ this technique to further improve the robustness of our system
against adversaries of the type of model II. There are two options to achieve this goal.
The first is to periodically update the shared certificate signing key ΣK. However, this
option involves network-wide well-known change of ΠK, which may not be desirable
from the application's perspective. The second option is the proactive secret sharing
mechanism. Instead of changing /K and ΠK, we update the secret share of each node
while keeping the shared ΣK intact.
Our constructed secret share updating algorithm is as follows:
1) The secret share is implemented within each cluster (as previous section)
2) Time periods for renewal are set arbitrarily at initial stage
3) Each node Vi, 0<i<n, picks k random numbers from the finite field and creates
a polynomial of degree k:
Where
	 δi(0) = 0
4) For all other nodes Vi, Vj secretly sends out δi(j)to Vj
5) Vi computes the new share by:
6) Vi updates its share and erases all other data
If all of the nodes follow the protocol, then the share renewal protocol is correct,
robust and secret:
• Each new round produces a valid set of secret shares
• Any k+1 servers can re-create the secret at any time
• With k or less shares, no information is learned
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The added advantage of proactivization in practical systems is that in a long-lived
threshold system (like RSA for public-key infrastructure) an adversary has a long time (5
years) to break into any t out of the 1 nodes, while in the proactive systems the adversary
has only a short period of time (say, a week) to break into any k nodes. This protection
seems important in a "long-lived" Mobile Ad Hoc network. Another advantage of the
"proactive model" is a flexible key management of share-holders in a function sharing
scheme. It enables, in the refreshing period, to change the set of shareholders (by giving
the recovered new share to the new node rather than the old one).
In case that "space diffusion" and "time diffusion" defenses in a cluster both fail,
the certificate services as a whole fail. That means all nodes within this cluster cannot get
certificates renewed or the renewed certificates are not valid. Since in our model clusters
are autonomous groups, which manage certificates themselves and update the local
repository of other cluster's certificate, the influence of one comprised cluster is reduced.
After the certificates of the nodes from a compromised cluster expire, they will be
expunged from the network; revocation of certificates will commence when enough
neighbor clusters judge that a particular cluster is abnormal and/or malicious.
3.5 Cluster-based Authentication, Certificate Renewal & Revocation
In previous sections, we discussed how secrets are distributed and maintained by
applying threshold cryptography in our LEGT algorithm, also have adopted, adapted, and
improved the salient aspects of proactive security [21,25], and publicly verifiable secret
sharing [35] security schemes. In this section, we mainly focus on certificate services,
cluster based authentication in LEGT. Certification services include issuing/renewing
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certificates, revoking certificates, storing and retrieving certificates, and the creation and
maintenance of certificate revocation lists (CRLs). Each certificate is stamped with an
expiration time. Nodes have to renew and get a new certificate before time expiration.
Certificates may become invalid before expiration. The revocation service has to put such
information on the revoked certificates into CRLs for queries from nodes.
Managing certificates and CAs involves the following processes:
• Issuing certificates to users and computers. The issuance process
includes obtaining and validating information about the intended
recipient of the certificate, placing policy restrictions designated by the
organization in certificates that are issued, and publishing the certificates
to a directory.
• Managing certificate lifetimes. Because all certificates have a limited
life, certificates need to be renewed or allowed to expire. The renewal
process is similar to the issuance process, but typically involves fewer
security checks. Thus, when an organization develops its renewal
strategy, it should balance security concerns against potential disruptions
to users
• Revoking certificates and verifying revocation status. Some certificates
need to be invalidated before their expiration date. Effective certificate
revocation and revocation verification processes are critical to the
security of an organization's public key infrastructure (PKI).
Authentication in the PKI system relies on two factors. For node Vi to
authenticate itself to another node, it has to prove its knowledge of the private key SKi,
and the association between itself and the advertised public key PKi. A
challenge/response protocol can be followed to prove the knowledge of the private key
SKi. The association is proved by a certificate.
3.5.1 Local Certificate Renewal/Revocation
As we described earlier, renewal of certificates is done within each cluster. Each node
broadcasts its renewal certificate requirement throughout the whole cluster. This
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broadcasting can be easily done because the CBRP keeps two-hop topology information
for each node, and the formation of the cluster requires 2-hop diameter. That means, for
each node, all other nodes within its cluster are already reachable. Therefore, when
implementing renewal of certificates, each node just needs to broadcast to its Two-hop
Database. No further routing discovery is needed. Thus, the overhead brought by
certificate renewal is kept low.
As in Figure 3.3, each node broadcasts its issuing/renewal requirement through
the whole cluster, and other member checks his performance history (assuming some
neighborhood watch IDS system exists) and decides whether to sign the new certificate
or signature. If yes, unicast partial signature share or certificate share signed by his share
of cluster private key. Node which can't get enough partial certificates or partial
signatures will be purged after certain time window.
Figure 3.3 Certificate renewal/revocation.
Also, there are some reasons or techniques in our LEGT to revoke a certificate:
• A node who is found providing a wrong partial certificate for other nodes in his
cluster, according to PVSS. Maybe a node who doesn't have the public key who
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claims to, and cannot decrypt his share correctly; maybe a node who
intentionally sends out a wrong partial certificate.
• A node who is found not cooperating with routing protocol
• A node who is found abnormal by intrusion detection system, please refer our
work in [26].
3.5.2 Creation of the Cluster Public Key Certificate and Repositories
As we described above, the public key certificate of each entity is signed by shares of the
cluster private key. In this section, we describe the creation of cluster public key
certificate and repositories. The cluster public key certificates are issued by other cluster
heads. If a cluster head CHm believes Cpk belongs to cluster CHn (generally cluster is
noted by its cluster head ID), then CHm can issue a public-key certificate in which Cpnk is
bound to CHn by cluster private key C.
The certificate graph changes during operation, when clusters issue certificates to
others or get certificates issued by other clusters. Therefore, a certificate exchange
mechanism is needed. Similarly to [1 ], the certificate exchange mechanism requires and
relies upon the periodic exchange of certificates between neighboring clusters. By the
certificate exchange mechanism, nodes accumulate certificates in their local certificate
repositories at a low communication cost because the exchanges are performed locally in
neighboring cluster and may combined with neighboring cluster discovery scheme
provide by routing protocol, for example, CBRP.
The certificate exchange enables the cluster heads to create their local certificate
repositories. Each cluster head constructs its updated repository by communicating with
their certificate graph neighbors. Typically, this algorithm runs in steps where in each
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step the node decides which certificates to store and how to proceed with the exploration
of the certificate graph. More details are given in [1]. After the construction of the local
repository, the nodes are ready for authentication.
3.5.3 Inter-cluster Authentication via Exchange of Certificates
Following, we discuss the performed steps of authentication in three different scenarios.
They are:
3.5.3.1 When a Node Joins a Network for the First Time. When a new node joins
the network and is detected by a cluster head (by means of hello messages). We assume
there are some reasons that one node trust another node, such as physical contact,
authorities commands [2], [13]. Here we have two options: 1) each node has his own key
pair<skj, pkj> and threshold scheme <k, n> is used to co-sign the certificates 2) to reduce
the public key directory, each group has only one common public key instead of each
node in the group has a key, and any subset of k individuals can sign the signature. We
could use the multisignature scheme presented in [16]. New node also gets the cluster
public key and cluster private key share when join in.
3.5.3.2 When a Node Leaves a Cluster and Joins Another Cluster. This situation
arises due to the movement of nodes. When a node moves from a cluster to new one, the
new cluster head first checks its certificate from old cluster. If the certificate is valid and
the new cluster head can find a chain path for old cluster head's public key in his
repository, the new cluster head believes the authenticity of the new node. The cluster
head then gives the node the cluster public key and one cluster private key share for the
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new cluster. The old cluster purges the entry for this node when it doesn't receive hello
message for a certain predefined time interval.
Figure 3.4 Authentication when node u is leaving from cluster 2 and entering cluster 3.
3.5.3.3 When a Node From a Cluster Wishes to Communicate with a Node
Belonging to Another Cluster. This is a complex scenario and our scheme tries to
minimize the overhead involved here. For example, node u from cluster 1 (Cluster header
is CH1) wants to communicate with node v from cluster 3 (Cluster header is CH3). First,
u and v exchanges their certificates signed by their group (As in Fig 3.3) through
challenge/response. If certificates are valid, there are two ways user u and v can check the
authenticity of each other's public key. First, cluster head maintains and keeps the local
cluster repository, so u and v transmit each other's certificate to their own cluster header,
namely CH1 and CH3. CH1 and CH3 merge a certificate path in their local repositories
and prove to u and v the authenticity of each other's certificate, as shown in Fig 3.5; the
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second way is that cluster head send cluster repository table to each node, and u and v can
merge the certificate path by themselves.
Figure 3.5 Mutual authentication between node u and v.
3.6 Implementation
In previous sections, we describe the general concept and design of our algorithm. In this
section, we discuss the implementation of our algorithm in ad hoc networks where
Cluster Based Routing protocol (CBRP) is used as routing protocol. We first review
CBRP background, then describe how implementations of certificate renewal, key
sharing update, construction of local repository are done applying messages, tables CBRP
already provides.
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3.6.1 CBRP Background
Cluster Based Routing Protocol (CBRP) is a routing protocol designed for use in mobile
ad hoc networks. The protocol divides the nodes of the ad hoc network into a number of
overlapping or disjoint 2-hop-diameter clusters in a distributed manner. A cluster head is
elected for each cluster to maintain cluster membership information. Inter- cluster routes
are discovered dynamically using the cluster membership information kept at each cluster
head. By clustering nodes into groups, the protocol efficiently minimizes the flooding
traffic during route discovery and speeds up this process as well. Furthermore, the
protocol takes into consideration the existence of unidirectional links and uses these links
for both intra-cluster and inter-cluster routing.
Following are several terms defined in CBRP:
1) Cluster: A cluster consists of a group of nodes with one of them elected as a
cluster head. A cluster is identified by its Cluster Head ID. Clusters are either overlapping
or disjoint. Each node in the network knows its corresponding Cluster Head(s) and
therefore knows which cluster(s) it belongs to.
2) Cluster Head: A cluster head is elected in the cluster formation process for
each cluster. Each cluster should have one and only one cluster head. The cluster head
has a bi-directional link to every node in the cluster. A cluster head will have complete
knowledge about group membership and link state information in the cluster within a
bounded time once the topology within a cluster stabilizes.
3) Cluster Member: All nodes within a cluster EXCEPT the cluster head are
called members of this cluster.
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4) Gateway Node: Any node a cluster head may use to communicate with an
adjacent cluster is called a gateway node.
5) HELLO message: All nodes broadcast HELLO messages periodically every
HELLO INTERVAL seconds; a node's HELLO message contains its Neighbor Table
_
and Cluster Adjacency Table. A node may sometimes broadcast a triggered HELLO
message in response to some event that needs quick action.
Following three tables are constructed and updated through HELLO messages in
each node:
1) Neighbor Table
The neighbor table is a conceptual data structure that employed for link status
sensing and cluster formation. Each entry contains
• the ID of the neighbor that it has connectivity with
• the role of the neighbor (a cluster head or a member).
• the status of that link (bi-directional or unidirectional)
2) Cluster Adjacency Table
The Cluster Adjacency Table keeps information about adjacent clusters and is
maintained by CBRP's Adjacent Cluster Discovery procedure.
Each entry contains:
• the ID of the neighboring cluster head
• the gateway node (a member) to reach the neighboring cluster head
• the status of the link from the gateway to the neighboring cluster head (bi-
directional or unidirectional)
3) Two-hop Topology Database
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In CBRP, each node broadcasts its neighbor table information periodically in
HELLO packets. Therefore, by examining the neighbor table from its neighbors, a node
is able to gather 'complete' information about the network topology that is at most two-
hops away from itself. This two-hop topology information is kept in a data structure in
each node.
3.6.2 Locally Certificate Renewal-Implementation
As we described in Section 3.5, certificates renewal is done within the each cluster. Each
node broadcasts its renewal requirement through the whole cluster. This broadcasting can
be easily done because CBRP keeps two-hop topology information in each node, and the
formation of cluster requires 2-hop diameter. That means, for each node, all other nodes
within its cluster are already reachable. Therefore, when implementing certificates
renewal, each node just needs broadcasting its Two-hop Database. No further routing
discovery is needed. The overhead brought by certificate renewal is kept low.
3.6.3 Cluster Certificate Graph Update and Construction of Cluster Repository
In our algorithm, authentication between members of different clusters is defined as two
steps: first check the binding of cluster public key and cluster id, then check the
authenticity of certificate signed by cluster private key. The binding of cluster public key
and cluster id is made public through "web of trust" [2], which means each cluster
member gives certificate for the partial certificate signed by his private cluster key share
if he believes the authenticity of objective public cluster key. When mutual authentication
is needed, local repositories of two clusters are merged to find the certificate chain.
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During networking operation, each node updates certificate graph and constructs local
repository based on the updated certificate graph.
Because only adjacent cluster certificate is needed, we make an extension to
existing Cluster Adjacency Table on each node, piggyback this extended table to HELLO
messages. When receives HELLO messages, each node can update its certificate graph
and chooses its outgoing and incoming edges as its local certificate repository.
Following is the format for our extended Cluster Adjacency Table:
Length	 The number of clusterheads listed
L	 Link Status of the corresponding Adjacent cluster head
0	 LINK_BIDIRECTIONAL
1 	 LINK_FROM
I	 Whether the corresponding adjacent cluster sign me a certificate?
0	 YES
1 	 NO
O	 Whether I have the certificate of corresponding adjacent cluster?
0	 YES
1 	 NO
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3.7 Evaluation
To evaluate our model is a hard issue since the security of our model is based on
mathematical foundations of cryptography schemes we are using and issues such as
operational network environment, adversary models are still open. In this section, we
analyze robustness of our security model, then we discuss the overhead and computation
operation it requires.
3.7.1 Security Analysis
In MANETs, Mobile hosts can be physically captured and compromised. Therefore,
authentication architecture should avoid having any central entity so that compromise of
one entity does not risk the whole network. In stead of using one or several CA servers,
we first distribute certificate services such as certificate issuing/renewal to all member
within the cluster. In each cluster, as if there are t or more nodes are working, the
certificate services still can work. Threshold cryptography (so called "space diffusion")
provides for increased availability of authentication, especially important in MANET
where nodes may operate in hostile environment. Another important threat for MANET
is "mobile adversary" which is adversary who move among the network to collect secret
shares. Given a shared function within each cluster as we describe above, we also use
proactive security (so called "time diffusion"), which adds a periodic refreshing of the
secret shares hold by each node. Therefore, our model can tolerate a "mobile adversary"
which can only collect less than t-1 shares within a time unit.
In case that "space diffusion" and "time diffusion" design in a cluster both fail,
the certificate services of this whole fail. That means all nodes within this cluster cannot
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get certificates renewed or renewed certificates are not valid. Since in our model clusters
are autonomous groups who manage certificates themselves and update local repository
of other cluster's certificate, the influence of one comprised cluster is reduced. After
certificates of nodes from compromised cluster expire, they will be expunged from
network; or certificates revocation will be turn on when enough neighbor clusters find a
cluster is abnormal.
Distribution of cluster private key also has other advantages. First, neighbor nodes
have the most frequent chance to communicate with each other, so they have largest
confidence to decide a neighbor node is normal or abnormal, then decide whether to sign
a certificate with their own key share. Generally IDS is installed on each node also based
on neighborhood watch, whose results can be combined into certificate services. Another
advantage of clustering enforced certificate is that the certificate chain to get an authentic
cluster public key is reduced. The shorter the chain, the smaller the probability of faked
certificate from compromised cluster.
3.7.2 Overhead
As we described in previous parts, our scheme extends the idea of certificate services
further in an attempt to minimize the effort and complexity for mobile clients to locate
and contact the service providers. We devise scalable algorithms and protocols to enable
the distribution of the certification services into every node. There is no differentiation of
servers and clients any more, in our architecture: a threshold number of any nodes can
collaboratively act as servers to provide services for other nodes.
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In implementation, our algorithm makes usage of existing Two-hop Database for
locally certificate renewal, the increasing number of routing messages is kept low; for
cluster certificate graph update, we makes extension to Cluster Adjacency Table which is
already "piggybacked" into HELLO message. Therefore, the total increased overhead to
network due to our algorithm is kept low.
3.7.3 Communication Performances
In this section, we will evaluate communication efficiency of our authentication protocol.
We implement Locally-Enforced algorithm on our MANET emulation network
(Manetbed) [261 Manetbed is a novel, low-cost MANET emulation test-bed which is
based on Ethernet environment. Manetbed provides mobile multi-hop wireless emulation
including routing protocols (currently CBRP and AODV), random waypoint mobility,
random packet loss, bandwidth limitation and communication delay. Manetbed emulation
is scalable, accurate and deploying on real nodes, running real traffics and applications.
In each node, we apply an application-layer agent that allows for delivery of
actual certificate renewal data units and one-hop broadcast. Two metrics are used for
evaluate the communication efficiency of our protocol: Success ratio means the ratio of
the number of successful certificate renewal over the number of attempts. Average delay
measures the average latency for each node to perform a certification renewal services.
Node number in our emulations is 50. Simulation time is 900 seconds. The node
mobility varies from 10, and 20m/sec. Pause time varies from 0, 30, 60, 120, 300, 600,
900 seconds. The Random waypoint model is used to emulate mobility patterns. The
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coalition size K=3 is chosen for threshold cryptography. 4 CAs services are implemented
also for comparison with our algorithm.
As it is shown in Figure 3.6, the certificate renewal success ratio of our Locally-
Enforced approach is around 98%, which is much better than centralized approach (4 CA
is used currently). In Figure 3.7, we also present results for the average delay for both
approaches. And we observe our Locally-Enforced algorithm has much smaller delay
compared with centralized approach. We also observe mobility that average delay almost
remains unchanged as mobility speed grows from 10m/sec to 20m/sec. However,
centralize approach has significant increasing delay as speed increasing.
Figure 3.6 Certificate Renewal: Success Ratio vs. Pause time.
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Figure 3.7 Certificate Renewal: Avg. Delay vs. Pause Time.
3.8 Conclusions
In this work we have dealt with security in ad hoc networks. We have focused on
authentication since this the core requirement to achieve other security services. We have
described several existing models and analyzed their scope, possible scenarios and
inherent problems. Finally we present a new authentication model for high-value
transactions in cluster-based MANET. This model is motivated by previous works but try
to use their beauties and avoid their shortcomings. Our model is using threshold sharing
of the certificate signing key within each cluster to distribute the certificate services, and
using certificate chain and certificate repository to achieve better scalability, less
overhead and better security performance. We also present in the paper an example of
adoption of the general design into Cluster Based Routing Protocol, (CBRP), which is
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one of the IEFT's candidates for a MANET routing protocol standard. We have
implemented our algorithm in our MANET emulation testbed (Manetbed) and get
evaluations about communication performance compared with centralized approach.
CHAPTER 4
INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM
4.1 Introduction
Protection of Ad Hoc networks basically focus on two aspects: Intrusion Prevention, such
as Traffic encryption, Sending data through multiple paths, Authentication and
authorization; Intrusion Detection, such as Anomaly pattern examination, Protocol
analytical study. In this chapter, a novel Flow-based Network Intrusion Detection System
(FNIDS) is presented. An IP flow is a unidirectional series of IP packets of a given
protocol, traveling between a source and destination, within a certain period of time.
Based on "flow" concept, a flow-based packet aggregation architecture is developed,
which dramatically reduces the amount of monitoring data and handles high amounts of
statistics and packet data. Existing flow-based network intrusion detection systems
mainly analyze and detect bandwidth type Denial of services attack. Our method uses
statistical models and multivariate classifiers to detect anomalous flow conditions. By
applying up to 22 parameters for each flow, our FNIDS can detect both bandwidth type
DOS and protocol type DOS. Moreover, flow here could be any set of packets sharing
certain common property as "flow key". FNIDS configures flow flexibly to provide
security from network level to application level (IP, TCP, UDP, HTTP, FTP...), and
different aggregation schemes, such as server -based, client-based flow. This novel IDS
has been evaluated by using CONEX wired test-bed and CONEX Mobile Ad hoc Test-
Bed. Results show the success in terms of different aggregation schemes for both
datasets. Some numerical results are also presented that demonstrate that our proposed
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methodology can reliably detect attacks with traffic anomaly intensity as low as 0.1-5
percent of the typical background traffic intensity, thus promising to generate an effective
early warning.
There currently exist multiple threats and vulnerabilities in the security of
computer systems and networks against attacks. Along with the explosive growth of the
Internet and the continued dramatic increase in all wireless services, the number and
impact of attacks has been increasing. This is evidenced by recent well-publicized denial
of service attacks against several prominent Web portals as well as many hushed over
occurrences. The number of computer systems and their vulnerability have been rising,
while the level of sophistication and knowledge required to carry out an attack has been
decreasing, as much technical attack knowhow is readily available on Web sites all over
the world [33].
Recent advances in encryption, public key exchange, digital signatures, and the
development of related standards have set a foundation for the flourishing of electronic
commerce. However, security on a network goes way beyond encryption of data. It must
include the security of computer systems and networks, at all levels, top to bottom. It is
imperative to arm the network systems and elements with well designed, comprehensive,
and integrated attack defeating policies and devices. However, foolproof prevention of
attacks is challenging because at best the defensive system and application software may
also contain unknown weaknesses and bugs. Thus, early warning systems (i.e., intrusion
detection systems or IDSs), as components of a comprehensive security system, are
required in order to prime the execution of countermeasures. The technique of statistical
anomaly and intrusion detection is the focal point of this article.
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4.1.1 Types of Intrusion Detection Systems
An IDS may be of the network/node (NID) or host (HID) type. That is, the IDS may
gather information from a computer (i.e., system audit logs and file states) or network of
computers (i.e., packets passing on the wire between hosts or arriving at a particular host)
in attempting to detect intruders or system abuse. Thus, network or node intrusion
detection (NID) systems, typically referred to as "packet sniffers," intercept packets of
various physical manifestations and protocols. In the past, NIDs have been challenged by
switched, encrypted, and high-speed networks (> 100 Mb/s). However, recently these
limitations have been largely overcome. For example, there are now NID systems that
may be installed on switches as well as monitor at gigabit speeds. After capturing a
packet, some NID devices will simply compare the packet to a signature database of
known attacks ("fingerprints"), while others seek to detect "anomalous" packet activity.
Thus, the NID techniques can be partitioned into two complementary trends: misuse
detection and anomaly detection. Misuse detection systems [34] model known attacks
and scan the system for occurrences of these patterns. Anomaly detection systems [35]
flag intrusions by observing significant deviations from typical or expected behavior of
systems or users. HIDs monitor and detect user and system activity and attacks on a given
host, so these systems are best suited to counter internal (intranetwork) threats because
they focus on monitoring user actions and file accesses on the host.
Intrusion detection research and development dates to the early 1980s starting
with Anderson's paper [36] that introduced the concept of computer threats and detection
of misuse, as applied to the host IDS, or HID. Dr. Denning's work [37] then introduced
the first model for intrusion detection, followed with the Haystack project IDS and later
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the distributed IDS (DIDS). In the early 1990s, NID was introduced [38], along with
early versions of commercial and government IDS systems. However, most IDS work is
rather recent; many research systems and commercial products appeared in the late
1990s, following the growth of the Internet [39].
Moreover, the past few years have witnessed much progress in all aspects of fault
detection, including path failure detection, anomaly detection in the Ethernet, anomaly
and performance change detection in small networks, network alarm correlation, and
real-time trouble ticketing information in a transaction-oriented communication network
[40]. The main objective of fault detection is to identify network exceptional conditions,
such as performance and utilization degradations. Under favorable conditions that can be
accomplished by design, network fault detection can anticipate the occurrence of high-
level service failures and compromises, and thereby increase the chances for proactive
fault correction before service failures set in.
4.1.2 Statistic Anomaly Detection
Statistical modeling and neural networks have been applied in building anomaly network
intrusion and fault detection systems. A system that identifies intrusions using packet
filtering and neural networks was introduced in [41]. The authors in [36] studied the
employment of neural networks to detect anomalous and unknown intrusions against a
software system. In [42], Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics was used to model and detect
DoS as well as probing attacks. In [43], we proposed the prototype of a Hierarchical
Intrusion Detection system (HIDE), while in [44] we introduced the Generalized
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Anomaly and Fault Threshold system (GAFT); these systems use statistical preprocessing
and neural network classification to detect network attacks and faults.
4.1.3 Applying Flow Concept in DDOS Detection
Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack presents a very serious threat to the stability
of the Internet. In a typical DDoS attack, a large number of compromised hosts are
amassed to send useless packets to jam a victim, or its Internet connection, or both. In the
last two years, it is discovered that DDoS attack methods and tools are becoming more
sophisticated, effective, and also more difficult to trace to the real attackers. Identifying,
diagnosing and treating anomalies in a timely fashion are a fundamental part of day-to-
day network operations. However, modeling the traffic at the packet level has proven to
be very difficult since traffic on a high-speed link is the result of a high level of
aggregation of numerous flows.
Recently, a new trend has emerged for modeling high-speed Internet traffic at the
flow level.
Strictly speaking, flow is a genetic concept. An IP flow is a set of packets, that are
observed in the network within some time period, and that share some common property
known as its key, which can be a TCP connection or a UDP stream described by source
and destination IP addresses, source and destination port numbers, or the protocol number
etc. If we collect and statistic packets from network based on pre-defined flow identifier
(or key), there are countless aggregation schemes. The flexible data collection and
analysis implementation based on flow make the NIDS have the advantage of greatly
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reducing the amount of data collected and the features formed by this aggregation
schemes can provide detailed network performance information.
Flow aggregation techniques are used to aggregate flows (packets) into one flow
with a larger granularity of classification (e.g., from port number to IP address).
Aggregated flows have a larger number of packets and longer flow duration that
dramatically reduces the amount of monitoring data and handles high amounts of
statistics and packet data. Therefore, Internet traffic flow profiling has become a useful
technique in the passive measurement and analysis field. The prerequisites for flow-based
measurements are now available within the network infrastructure — particularly, in
popular Cisco network devices. The integration of this feature has enabled the 'flow'
concept to become a valuable method.
Despite a large literature on traffic characterization, traffic anomalies remain
poorly understood. There are a number of reasons for this. First, identifying anomalies
requires a sophisticated monitoring infrastructure. Unfortunately, most ISPs only collect
simple traffic measures, e.g., average traffic volumes (using SNMP). More adventurous
ISPs do collect flow counts on edge links, but processing the collected data is a
demanding task. A second reason for the lack of understanding of traffic anomalies is that
ISPs do not have tools for processing measurements that are fast enough to detect
anomalies in real time. Thus, ISPs are typically aware of major events (worms or
flooding DoS attacks) after the fact, but are generally not able to detect them while they
are in progress.
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4.1.4 Problems of Current IDS Techniques in MANET Networks
The vast difference between the fixed network where current intrusion detection research
are taking place and the mobile ad-hoc network which is the focus of this paper makes it
very difficult to apply intrusion detection techniques developed for one environment to
another. The most important difference is perhaps that the latter does not have a fixed
infrastructure, and today's network-based IDSs, which rely on real-time traffic analysis,
can no longer function well in the new environment. Compared with wired networks
where traffic monitoring is usually done at switches, routers and gateways, the mobile ad-
hoc environment does not have such traffic concentration points where the IDS can
collect audit data for the entire network. Therefore, at any one time, the only available
audit trace will be limited to communication activities taking place within the radio
range, and the intrusion detection algorithms must be made to work on this partial and
localized information.
Furthermore, there may not be a clear separation between normalcy and anomaly
in mobile environment. A node that sends out false routing information could be the one
that has been compromised, or merely the one that is temporarily out of sync due to
volatile physical movement. Intrusion detection may find it increasingly difficult to
distinguish false alarms from real intrusions.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 describes the system
architecture. Section 4.3 described the statistic model and parameter used, Section 4.4
discusses reference model, score metrics and Neural Network Classification; Section 4.5
introduces the CONEX Test bed and CONEX Manetbed. Some experimental results are
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also reported in that section. Section 4.6 draws some conclusions and outlines future
work.
4.2 System Architecture
FNIDS is a hierarchical multitier system that may run in a distributed as well as
standalone fashion. It is a security component that monitors the activities of a host or the
network to which it is attached. It gathers data from network traffic, statistically
processes and analyzes the flow information; detects abnormal activity patterns based on
the reference models, which correspond to the expected activities of typical users, for
each parameter individually, or in combined groups using neural network classification;
generates the system alarms and event reports;
Each FNIDS agent consists of the following components: the probe, the event
preprocessor, the statistical processor, the neural network classifier, and the post
processor. A diagram of the FINDS is given in Figure 4.1. The probe collects the network
traffic of a host or network, abstracts the traffic into a set of statistical variables to reflect
the network status, and periodically generates reports to the event preprocessor. The
event preprocessor receives reports from the probe, and converts the information into the
format required by the statistical model. The statistical processor maintains reference
models of typical network activities, compares the reports from the event preprocessor to
the reference models, and forms a stimulus vector to feed into the neural network
classifiers. The neural network classifier analyzes the stimulus vector from the statistical
model to decide whether the network traffic is normal or not. The post processor
79
generates reports for the agents at higher tiers. At the same time, it may display the local
results through a user interface.
Neural network classifier uses back-propagation networks to classify score metric
of each flow. Existing Flow-based Network Intrusion Detection Systems (FNIDS) mainly
analyze and detect bandwidth depletion Denial of services attack. By applying up to 22
parameters for each flow, our FNIDS can detect both bandwidth depletion DOS and
resource depletion DOS. Moreover, flow here could be any set of packets sharing certain
common property as "flow key". FNIDS configures flow flexibly to provide security
from network level to application level (IP, TCP, UDP, HTTP, FTP...), and different
aggregation schemes, such as server -based, client-based flow.
Because network traffic is not stationary and network-based attacks may have
different time duration, we need to monitor network traffic with different time windows.
Thus, we adopted a nested layer-window model with each window corresponding to a
geometrically increasing detection time slice (typically by a factor of 4). The newly
arrived events will first be stored in the event buffer of observation window layer 1. The
stored events will be compared to the reference model of that layer; the similarity results
are then fed into a neural network classifier to detect the network status during that time
window.
The event buffer will be emptied once it becomes full, and the stored events will
be averaged and forwarded to the event buffer of layer 2. The same process will be
repeated recursively until data arrives at the top level where the events will simply be
dropped after processing.
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Figure 4.1 Flow-based network intrusion detection system architecture.
Event Preprocessor: Collects the network traffic of a host or a network, Event
handlers generate reports to Flow management module;
Event Timer: Periodically calls Feature Extraction Module to converts the
statistic information of flows into the format required by the statistical model.
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Flow Management Module: efficiently determines if a packet is part of an
existing flow or should generate a new flow key; According to different flow key, this
module aggregates flows together based on their flow keys, and dynamically updates per-
flow accounting measurements;
Probe: Collects the network traffic, abstracts the traffic into a set of statistical
parameters to reflect the network status.
Feature Extraction: Periodically extracts the features, which describe the
behaviors of flows.
Feature Scoring Metric: Calculates the probability scores of these features by
comparing the features with the reference model generated by past normal and attack
users. The probability scores are measurements indicating how likely for a feature to take
the observed value.
Neural Network classifier: Classifies the score vectors to prioritize flows with
maliciousness. The higher maliciousness of a flow means the flow has the higher
possibility of attacker.
4.3 The Statistic Model
An activity profile characterizes the behavior of a given monitored parameter thereby
serving as a description of normal activity for its respective subject. Observed behavior
may be described using a statistical metric and model.
The period of observation may be a fixed interval of time (sec, minute, etc.), or
the time between two audit-related events (i.e., between login and logout, file open and
file close, etc.). Observations (sample points) xi of x are used together with a statistical
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model to determine whether a new observation is abnormal. It is preferred that the
statistical model makes no assumptions about the underlying distribution of x; in such
systems, all knowledge about x is obtained from observations. In our work, traffic
profiles are represented by a number of probability density functions. Let S be the sample
space of a random variable and events El, E2, Ek a mutually exclusive partition of S
Assume that pi is the expected probability of the occurrence of event E', p2i represents the
actual probability of the occurrence of Ei during a time interval, and N is the total number
of occurrences.
Most earlier IDS systems simply measured the means and variances of the
monitored variables and detected whether certain thresholds were exceeded; in
nonstationary systems that often do not follow the normal distribution, such systems
generate incorrect decisions. To overcome some of these problems, NIDES [35] used a
X2 -like statistical test to determine the similarity Q between the expected and actual
distributions. However, in real applications empirically Q may not follow 2,2
distributions; therefore, NIDES solved this problem by building an empirical probability
distribution for Q that is updated daily in real-time operation.
In our FNIDS system, since we are using neural networks to classify patterns and
identify possible intrusions, we are not as concerned with the actual distribution of
similarity metrics, which is described in following section; it is expected that the neural
net will learn it from examples.
Detecting intrusions involves the multi-variants classifications based on the monitored
features. Generally, intrusion detection systems are designed to use as many features as
the designers could think they might be useful. For example, JAM [45], an intrusion
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detection system prototyped by Columbia University, monitors 41 different parameters
for each session. In our system, FNIDS provided up to 45 features, which are relevant in
DoS attack detection [46]. The table 4.1 lists 22 selected features.
Table 4.1 Features in Set22
Index Name Index Name
1 in.ip-pkt-rate 12 in.tcp-con-new-aborted
2 in.ip-byt-rate 13 in. tcp-con-half-opened-ratio
3 in.ip-frag-rate 14 in.tcp-con-duration
4 in.ip-defrag-error-rate 15 in.tcp-con-diff-src
5 in.ip-csum-error-rate 16 in.tcp-con-diff-dst
6 in.tcp-pkt-len 17 in.tcp-con-anomalous-entropy
7 in.tcp-pkt-rate 18 in.icmp-pkt-rate
8 in.tcp-syn-pkt-rate 19 in.icmp-byt-rate
9 in.tcp-rst-pkt-rate 20 in.icmp-diff-src
10 in.tcp-con-new-opened 21 in.icmp-diff-dst
11 in.tcp-con-new-closed 22 lo.icmp-anomalous-echo-reply
In our statistical model, abnormally detection is based on that features of attack
traffic have different probability density distribution compared with features of normal
traffic. Following, we visualization some popular attacks such as Teardrop, POD, Smurf,
Neptune.
Sudden changes in packet counts, especially when based on protocol aggregation
scheme, are usually indications of a flood as well. Figure 4.2 is an example based on IP
traffic rate representing two kinds of floods. The x-axis of the figure is time window, in
this experiment, it was set as 30seconds/time window; the y-axis of the figure is traffic
change, which shows the discrepancy between the number of inbound and outbound
flows or traffics. The figure 4.2 clearly shows when the flooding attacks (Smurf and
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Neptune) happened. Figure 4.3 is an example graph based on flow counts representing
Pod attacks. Figure 4.4 is an example graph based on IP fragment rate representing
`Teardrop' Attacks.
Figure 4.2 Smurf and Neptune DDoS flooding.
Figure 4.3 PoD attacks.
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Figure 4.4 Teardrop Attack.
4.4 Neural Network Classification
As mentioned above, many types of distance metrics may be employed by the statistical
analyzer to generate similarity measures. The output of the statistical processor is a k-
dimensional ordered vector whose components are the similarity values of the measured
PDFs to the reference PDFs of the k monitored network or system parameters collected
during an observation window. This k-dimensional vector represents an evaluation of the
status of the network or system during that observation time. Subsequently, this status
vector gets presented to the multivariate classifier for a classification result. Clearly, the
efficacy of this classifier is crucial to the success of the endeavor.
In this dissertation we chose the neural network classifiers. The k-dimensional
ordered vector produced by the statistical processor to the classifier may be thought of as
an input pattern to the classifier. Neural networks are widely considered an effective
approach to handling and classifying patterns. However, the sometimes high computation
requirements as well as computation requirements as well as long training cycles have
hindered their applications. This is due to the fact that such neural networks often intake a
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large number of inputs (several tens or hundreds) and utilize many (several dozen or
more) computational neurons in one or several hidden layer(s). In other words, in such
cases the neural networks are expected to carry out by themselves the majority of the
computational work that leads to a decision. In contrast, our system uses powerful and
comprehensive statistical preprocessing before presenting the vector of computed
similarity values to the classifier for a decision and thus can perform effectively by
deploying small and "lean" neural network classifiers, with only the minimum of inputs,
a handful of computational neurons, and if otherwise a correspondingly small total
number of weights. For about a dozen simultaneously monitored parameters leading to an
equal number of inputs, as is the case here, the resulting neural net can compute a
classification decision using only a few hundred clock cycles; thus, the trained neural net
classifier can definitely be part of real-time operation. Moreover, this neural net
converges within less than 100 training epochs requiring at worst a few thousand clock
cycles per training sample. Therefore, the computational demands for the training
operation of our system are modest as well, and it is feasible to carry them out
automatically, using either offpeak times or other schemes, including real-time operation.
In [43], we studied the performances of five different types of neural networks:
perception, back propagation (BP), perceptron-back propagation hybrid (PBH), radial-
based function (RBF), and fuzzy ARTMAP. Our experimental results showed that the BP
and PBH networks had stronger classification. Following this conclusion, we are using a
BP network with two hidden neurons. This network is very small and efficient, but still
has very good classification capability.
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In FNIDS, neural network classifier maintains reference model of flow statistics
features (22 features are using as in section 4.3) during training stage, calculates
similarity metrics for scoring distance of current flow from reference model, uses back-
propagation neural network for classifying each flow as normal or abnormal.
4.4.1 Reference Models
In our FNIDS, the extracted flow features will be scored based on the information of the
reference models. The reference models are in fact probability density functions (PDF) of
the feature values. Figure 4.2 showed the measured normal-type and attack-type PDF
samples of different features, which were based on Darpa 98 data of the 5 th and 6th
Thursday, including DoS/DDoS, like 'POD', 'Teardrop',' Neptune' and `Smurf' . Since
the actual legitimate flow distribution during attack is unknown, the approach needs to
establish a reference profile of normal users and the reference model of attackers from the
past traffic. Just only off-line reference model is not enough. We ensured that the
reference model would be updated actively in each time window. While attack packets
arrive continuously and the true flow profile changes as new packets arrive, the reference
profile is updated and flow is scored at the same time.
(a) IP packet rate (Week 5, Thursday) 	 (b) IP packet rate (Week 6,Thursday)
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(c) ICMP packet rate (Week 5, Thursday) 	 (d) ICMP packet rate (Week 6, Thursday)
Figure 4.5 The PDF of various packet rates based on Darpa 98 data set.
Evidently, as seen from the graphs, there is some overlap between the normal-
type PDFs and the abnormal-type PDFs. This means that single parameter threshold
classification is error prone. However, it is most significant that, in general, the normal-
type and the abnormal-type PDFs are very different from each other at some features.
This means that statistical methods that capitalize on these differences can be very
effective, especially, if many or all of the features were utilized in unison in arriving at
the classification decision. This is exactly how the technique used here and the resulting
tool, termed Flow-based Network IDS Intrusion Detection System (FNIDS), achieves its
high rate of success.
4.4.2 Score Metrics
There are many statistic metrics used in NIDS. Our current statistical model uses Single
Number Statistics (SNS). Let X be the feature value, Pn(x) be the probability of x in the
normal reference model, Pa(x) be the probability of x in the attack reference model, Pn ,max
be the maximum probability of the normal reference model, and Pa,max be the maximum
probability of the attack reference model. The distance of the SNS is defined as the
following metrics:
Single Number Statistics version 1(SNS1):
Single Number Statistics version 2(SNS2):
Single Number Statistics version 3(SNS3):
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(4.1)
(4.2)
(4.3)
Where: S is between [-1,11. S =1 means `normal'; and S= -1 means 'abnormal'
From the above equations, it can be seen that metric 1 is an anomaly detection
approach by comparing feature values with normal reference model. The metric 3 is a
normal detection approach by comparing feature value with abnormal reference model.
The metric 2 is a hybrid signature-anomaly detection approach by utilizing both known
normal and known attack knowledge. Apparently, the Metric 1 will be more robust to
detect new attacks; especially it can identify the low-rate attack without retraining neural
network, because the reference model of this way is only based on normal packets.
There are evidently, two kinds of feature vectors here, the normal N-type, labeled
as +1, and the malicious M-type, labeled as —1. These labeled N and M vectors can be
used for training (2/3 of the total number) and validating (1/3 of the total number) the
classifier. In this work, a neural network classifier was employed.
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Table 4.2 Performance of Difference Metrics on CONEX Testbed Data using Session-
based Aggregation Scheme
SNS1 SNS2 SNS3
umber of samples 100701 100701 100701
umber of normal samples 99429 99429 99429
umber of attack samples 1272 1272 1272
umber of False Positives 12 100 363
umber of False Negatives 0 0 0
Misclassification Rate 0.000119165 0.000993039 0.00360473
alse Positive Rate 0.000120689 0.00100574 0.00365085
alse Negative Rate 0 0 0
In our experiments, we compared these metrics. Form Table 4.2, the results
showed that all these metrics can detect Dos. But the Table 4.2 shows that SNS2 and
SNS3 have high false positive. Since SNS1 has a good performance, and it is only based
on normal behaviors, it will be used in our following discussion.
4.4.3 Neural Network Architecture
Neural network classifiers have been widely considered as an efficient approach to
classify challenging patterns. However, here, statistical preprocessing has generated
easily discernible and distinguishable normal and abnormal patterns. A 2-layered neural
network was built with 22 inputs and one output unit.
The back-propagation neural network classifier [47] (see Figure 4.6) was used to
train feature-scoring vectors by modifying the weights of inputs. Each network utilized
sigmoid neurons and used on all 22 predictor variables. Again, this was done 1000 times
for each random split of the data set .The Back-Propagation Neural Networks was used to
evaluate each flow with maliciousness.
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Figure 4.6 Back-propagation classifier.
4.5 Performance Evaluation And Results
The experimental test results to date have emphasized DoS/DDoS attacks and faults due
to their prominent role in computer networks, in both wired and wireless ad hoc
networks. Two main categories of DoS/DDoS attacks are included: bandwidth depletion,
such as: udp flooding, ICMP flooding, smurf, and resource depletion attacks, such as:
Syn flooding, Ping of Death and Teardrop. A bandwidth depletion attack is designed to
flood the victim network with unwanted traffic that prevents legitimate traffic from
reaching the (primary) victim system. A resource depletion attack is an attack that is
designed to tie up the resources of a victim system. This type of attack targets a server or
process on the victim system making it unable to process legitimate requests for service.
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DARPA'98 evaluation represents a significant contribution to the field of
intrusion detection, there are many unresolved issues associated with its design and
execution. In his critique, McHugh [49] questioned a number of results of DARPA'98
evaluation, starting from usage of synthetic simulated data for the background (normal
data) and using attacks implemented via scripts and programs collected from a variety of
sources. In addition, it is known that the background data contains none of the
background noise (packet storms, strange fragments, etc.) that characterizes real data.
Moreover, in order to assess the performance of our anomaly detection algorithms in a
live network, we evaluated our FNIDS in CONEX test-bed. The CONEX TESTBED
network is a test-bed network setup in the CONEX lab of NJIT as a platform to launch
network-based attacks and real background traffic (HTTP, FTP, SMTP...), for evaluation
of intrusion detection prototypes.
In order to demonstrate the efficiency and robustness of FNIDS, along with its
general-purpose applicability in networking environments with different characteristics
and topologies, in this section we present some experiments and the corresponding
numerical results we obtained applying our proposed system in two different networking
environments as described in the following sections:
• A wired conventional network (CONEX wired test-bed)
• A wireless ad hoc network (CONEX MANETBED)
4.5.1 CONEX Wired Test-bed
Due to various limitations of DARPA'98 intrusion detection evaluation data discussed
above [49], we have conducted our experiments on live network at the CONEX lab of
NJIT. The CONEX TESTBED network, as in Figure 4.7, is a test-bed network setup in
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the CONEX lab of NJIT as a platform to emulate network-based attacks in order to test
the performance of intrusion detection prototypes. The network includes three subnets:
victim subnet, background subnet and the attack subnet. A more detailed description
about the network topology, the attack emulations and the related tools can be found in
[46].
Figure 4.7 Topology of the CONEX Testbed network.
4.5.2 CONEX MANETBED
In order to demonstrate the applicability of our proposed approach as a general-purpose
anomaly detection tool, we tested it in a dynamic mobile wireless ad hoc network. Due to
the characteristics of open medium, dynamic changing topology, cooperative algorithms,
and lack of a centralized monitoring and management point, wireless ad hoc networks are
particularly vulnerable.
Mobile nodes are autonomous units that are capable of roaming independently.
This means that nodes with inadequate physical protection may be captured,
compromised, or hijacked. Wireless ad hoc networks do not have a clear line of defense,
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and every node must be prepared for encounters with an adversary directly or indirectly;
in other words, all other nodes must be treated as untrustworthy.
In [32], we describe the design and implementation of a novel low cost MANET
emulation test-bed called Manetbed, which is based on low cost Ethernet environment.
Manetbed provides mobile multi-hop wireless emulation including routing protocols
(currently CBRP and AODV), random waypoint mobility, random packet loss,
bandwidth limitation and communication delay. Manetbed infrastructure is extensible,
easy maintenance especially for large network, facilitating the development and
evaluation of new routing protocols, traffic models, security services.
Manetbed is built on Linux hosts where mobile nodes in the MANET are
represented by actual computers running the actual protocol software with the actual
Ethernet interfaces connected to it. To approach a real large-scale wireless environment,
we install multiple network interface cards (NICs) in each Linux host and each NIC
functions as one mobile node. A piece of small software is inserted into the kernel
between network layer and Ethernet interface, providing multi-hop wireless link
emulation. Random way-point module is used to generate mobility information and
connectivity status. We use Linux Traffic Control (tc) to set bandwidth on each link. We
write a separate tool in the kernel to drop packet randomly to control wireless packet
error rate.
Figure 4.8 shows architecture of Manetbed. Multiple NICs are installed in each
Linux host. Each NIC is simulated as one mobile node. To maximize the number of
nodes, we use Adaptec Quartet four-port 10/100 PCI Adapter ANA-6944A/TX which has
four network ports on one PCI card. While the number of nodes a host can have depends
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on the number of PCI slots in the motherboard, too many network connections may slow
down the system. In current Manetbed, we have 12 Linux hosts simulating up to 12*12
(144) nodes at the same time.
Figure 4.8 ManetBed layout.
The blue lines represent the control / data exchange port, and black lines represent
node traffic port, respectively. These two different ports can be hooked to different LAN,
or to the same LAN as what the figure shows
We have several kinds of traffic in the system and they can be divided into:
• • Control and data exchange packet. This is the traffic we send through the
control interface (blue lines in Figure. 1) to collect data and co-ordinate CBRP
nodes across the hosts.
• • Routing broadcast message (HELLO).
• • Routing message (RREQ, RREP, etc.).
• • Traffic data. This is the actual traffic data (ssh, ftp, HTTP, Smtp, telnet...) we
run in Manetbed.
4.5.3 Experiments in Wired Test-bed
The Table 4.3 presents the false/true positive ratio of four aggregation schemes that
detect various attacks. From this table, it can be seen that session-based aggregation
schemes performed very well in detecting DDOS attacks with false positive ratio rates
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0%. This indicates that session-based aggregation scheme has the best performance when
there are no spoofing flooding attacks.
Table 4.3 False/True Positive Ratio in Wired Test-bed
Attack
names
Session-basedlP-based Client-Based Server-Based
False/True
Positive Ratio
False /True
Positive Ratio
alse/TrueFalse/True ositivePositive Ratio atio
bloop 0 0.037 0 0.037
fawx 0 0.36 0 0.36
fraggle 0 0 00
smurf 0 0.027 0.0106 0.027
teardrop° 0 0 0
Table 4.4 Performances of Four Aggregation Schemes
Session-
Base IP-Base
Client-
Base
Server-
Base
Number of samples 84943 25262 8397 22555
Number of normal
samples 83898 24228 7786 22089
Number of attack samples 1045 1034 466611
Misclassification Rate 0. 00401 0. 00134 O. 00107 0. 0047
False Positive Rate 0. 00398 0. 00103 0. 000771 0. 0048
False Negative Rate 0. 0096 0. 0088 0. 0049 0. 1148
From table 4.4, it can be seen that the misclassification rate is 0.401% for session-
based aggregation, 0.102% for IP-based aggregation, 0.107% for client-based
aggregation, 0.47% for server-based aggregation. The performances in table 3 proved that
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the more detailed flow-key is, the performance is better when flooding attacks are not
spoofed.
Figure 4.9 Receiver Operating Characteristic Curves.
Figure 4.9 shows the ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic curves) of some
selected flow-based aggregation schemes. we can observe that all of the ROC curves
have very high detection rate. The detection rate is above 94%-99% when false alarm rate
is about 0.2%.
4.5.4 Ad Hoc Wireless Experiments
In order to demonstrate the applicability of our proposed approach as a general-purpose
anomaly detection tool, we tested it in a dynamic mobile wireless ad hoc network. We
carried out simulation experiments on our ManetBed, with a 50-node 677*677 topology,
and investigated FNIDS's detection effectiveness under various mobility scenarios, as
well as various background traffic intensity levels of 20k, 50k, 100k, 200k, 500k and 1M
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byte/second. We generate ICMP attack with average attack traffic as 1k byte/second,
which gives attack intensities from 0.1 to 5 percent of background traffic.
It was found that FNIDS gives significantly high detection rates along with low
misclassification rates as in Figure 4.10 in different traffic loads. Packet drop rate is 0.5
percent and maximum speed is 20m/s in these testing scenarios.
Figure 4.10 ROC curves for background traffic rate 20k, 50k, 500k.
Figure 4.10 depicts the corresponding receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
curves. It shows significantly high detection rates along with low misclassification rates
when the attack intensity is as small as 0.1-5 percent of the background traffic. Similar
results have been found for other mobility speeds (e.g., 20 and 80 km/h). In summary,
these results indicate that the performance of our anomaly intrusion detection system
performs well in the challenging setting of the mobile ad hoc network.
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4.6 Conclusion
The FNIDS statistical anomaly detection technology is characterized by several
innovative features. It is a hierarchical multitier multi-observation window system that
monitors several network traffic flows simultaneously using realtime parameters,
collected during the observation window. It calculates a similarity value of each
measured flow to the reference PDF, then intelligently combines the similarity
measurements into an anomaly status vector that is classified by a neural network. This
combining is powerful in that it achieves higher discrimination and decision robustness.
The numerical results demonstrate that this anomaly detection methodology can reliably
detect attacks and soft faults with traffic anomaly intensity as low as 0.1-5 percent of
typical background traffic intensity, thus promising to generate an effective early warning
in both wired and wireless networks..
CHAPTER 5
QUANTITATIVE SECURITY ASSESSMENT OF MANS
5.1 Introduction
We proposed in this dissertation a unified security architecture (MANS), under which
IDS agent, authentication, recovery policy and other policies can be defined formally and
explicitly, and are enforced by a uniform architecture, which provides protection of Ad
Hoc networks basically focus on aspects: Intrusion Prevention, Intrusion Detection, and
recovery response. As a basic preventive solution, a fully localized, digital certificate
base authentication services is proposed. An intrusion Detection and response system
(IDS) provides the corrective solution feeding the certificate services with information
about misbehaving nodes, which are eliminated from the network by certificate
revocation. Both certificate services and IDS are designed to be robust even in the
presence of compromised nodes. We also presented evaluations for each aspect in
previous chapters.
In this chapter, we are going to assess security risk of MANET protected by
MANS. We consider a unified consistent scheme of vulnerabilities, threats in MANET
and corresponding countermeasures provided by MANS. A quantitative risk assessment
provides results in numbers that management can understand, whereas a qualitative
approach, although easier to implement, makes it difficult to trace generalized results.
In [53], authors propose a modification of some of the decision-tree-based
model's qualitative attributes, in case the quantitative data are unavailable. The proposed
model is practical and simple to use for beginners in the field, but it also provides a
mathematical—statistical foundation on which strategists or practitioners can construct a
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practical risk valuation. The probabilistic assumptions, such as using a uniformly
distributed random variable for the input variables, can be improved by using other
statistical distributions. Other techniques used hitherto within a nonprobabilistic frame,
such as attack trees, don't provide an accurate overall picture of the risk to the system
that's being protected
We applied the above proposed security-meter design in this chapter for
quantitative risk evaluation of MANS, favorably compared to most current assessments
that provide qualitative results. This is achieved by a probabilistically accurate
quantitative model that measures security risk. To further facilitate security risk
management and security testing, the final risk measure calculated as a percentage which
can be tested, improved, compared, and budgeted as opposed to attributes such as high,
medium, or low, which cannot be managed or quantified numerically for an objective
assessment.
This chapter is organized as following: Section 5.2 discusses specific attacks to
Ad Hoc Routing, which was not covered in previous chapters; Section 5.3 overview
quantitative security model; Section 5.4 represents Quantitative Analysis of MANS;
5.2 Ad Hoc Routing Vulnerability and Protection by MANS
In previous chapters, we discussed vulnerabilities, attacks which popularly happening for
wired network, such as spoofing, denial of services attacks. This section, we mainly focus
on specific attacks to Ad Hoc Routing. Similar to wired network routing, there are two
kinds of attacks toward Ad Hoc routing protocols: passive attacks, and active attacks
{65].
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5.2.1 Passive Attacks
Passive attacks typically involve unauthorized "listening" to the routing packets. That is,
the attacker does not disrupt the operation of a routing protocol but only attempts to
discover valuable information by listening to the routing traffic.
The major advantage for the attacker in passive attacks is that in a wireless
environment the attack is usually impossible to detect. This also makes defending against
such attacks difficult. Furthermore, routing information can reveal relationships between
nodes or disclose their addresses. If a route to a particular node is requested more often
than to other nodes, the attacker might expect that the node is important for the
functioning of the network, and disabling it could bring the entire network down.
Other interesting information that is disclosed by routing data is the location of
nodes. Even when it might not be possible to pinpoint the exact location of a node, one
may be able to discover information about the network topology.
5.2.2 Active Attacks
To perform an active attack the attacker must be able to inject arbitrary packets into the
network. The goal may be to attract packets destined to other nodes to the attacker for
analysis or just to disable the network. A major difference in comparison with passive
attacks is that an active attack can sometimes be detected. This makes active attacks a
less inviting option for most attackers.
Next we describe some types of active attacks that can usually be easily
performed against an ad hoc network.
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• Black Hole -- A malicious node uses the routing protocol to advertise itself as
having the shortest path to nodes whose packets it wants to intercept. In a
flooding based protocol such as AODV, the attacker listens to requests for
routes. When the attacker receives a request for a route to the target node, the
attacker creates a reply where an extremely short route is advertised. If the
malicious reply reaches the requesting node before the reply from the actual
node, a forged route has been created. Once the malicious device has been able
to insert itself between the communicating nodes, it is able to do anything with
the packets passing between them. It can choose to drop the packets to perform a
denial-of-service attack, or alternatively use its place on the route as the first
step in a man-in-the-middle attack.
• Rushing attack -- Some routing protocols such as AODV instantiate and
maintain routes by assigning monotonically increasing sequence numbers to
routes toward specific destinations. In AODV, any node may divert traffic
through itself by advertising a route to a node with a destination sequence
number greater than the authentic value [66]. Even the source node eventually
receives the legitimate ROUTE REPLY (RREP) packets, it will discard those
packets, thinking that the valid route is stale. Hence, the source node would not
be able to find secure routes, that is, routes that do not include the adversary
node.
• Wormhole attack -- In the wormhole attack, an attacker records packet at one
location in the network, tunnels them to another location, and retransmits them
from there into the network. Due to the broadcast nature of the radio channel,
the attacker can create a wormhole even for packets not addressed to itself If a
wormhole attacker tunnels all packets through the wormhole honestly and
reliably, no harm is done; the attacker actually provides a useful service in
connecting the network more efficiently [66]. However, when an attacker
forwards only routing control messages, this attack might severely disrupt
routing. For example, when used against an on-demand routing protocol such as
DSR or AODV, a powerful application of the wormhole attack can be mounted
by tunneling each RREQ packet directly to the target node of the RREQ. This
attack prevents any node from discovering routes more than two hops long.
• Spoofing attacks -- Spoofing occurs when a node misrepresents its identity in
the network, such as by altering its MAC or IP address in outgoing packets [65].
By masquerading as another node, a malicious node can launch many attacks in
a network. Spoofing combined with packet modification is really a dangerous
attack, for example, it can cause routing loops in ad hoc networks.
• Route Error Fabrication -- AODV implements path maintenance to recover
broken paths when nodes move. If the destination node or an intermediate node
along an active path moves, the node upstream of the link break broadcasts a
route error message to all active upstream neighbors. The node also invalidates
the route for this destination in its routing table. The vulnerability is that routing
attacks can be launched by sending false route error messages, causing other
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nodes delete the valid entry in their routing table, therefore disrupt the
communications. Such attacks can be difficult to verify as invalid constructs,
especially in the case of fabricated error messages that claim a neighbor cannot
be contacted [66].
• Routing Table Overflow -- In a routing table overflow attack the attacker
attempts to create routes to nonexistent nodes. The goal is to create enough
routes to prevent new routes from being created or to overwhelm the protocol
implementation. Proactive routing algorithms attempt to discover routing
information even before it is needed while a reactive algorithm creates a route
only once it is needed. This property appears to make proactive algorithms more
vulnerable to table overflow attacks. An attacker can simply send excessive
route advertisements to the routers in a network. Reactive protocols, such as
AODV on the other hand, do not collect routing data in advance.
• Sleep Deprivation Torture -- Usually, attack is practical only in Ad Hoc
networks, where battery life is a critical parameter. Battery powered devices try
to conserve energy by transmitting only when absolutely necessary. An attacker
can attempt to consume batteries by requesting routes, or by forwarding
unnecessary packets to the node using, for example, a black hole attack. This
attack is especially suitable against devices that do not offer any services to the
network or offer services only to those who have some special credentials.
Regardless of the properties of the services, a node must participate in the
routing process unless it is willing to risk becoming unreachable to the network.
• Location Disclosure -- A location disclosure attack can reveal something about
the locations of nodes or the structure of the network. The information gained
might reveal which other nodes are adjacent to the target, or the physical
location of a node. The attack can be as simple as using an equivalent of the
trace route command on Unix systems. Routing messages are sent with
inadequate hop-limit values and the addresses of the devices sending the ICMP
error-messages are recorded. In the end, the attacker knows which nodes are
situated on the route to the target node. If the locations of some of the
intermediary nodes are known, one can gain information about the location of
the target as well.
5.2.3 MANS Routing Protocol Protection
As we discussed in previous chapters, the architecture of the Mobile Ad-hoc Network
Security (MANS) System, includes authentication agent, IDS agent, recovery policy and
other policies which can be defined formally and explicitly, and are enforced by a
uniform architecture. As a basic preventive solution, a fully localized, digital certificate
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base authentication services is proposed. An intrusion Detection and response system
(IDS) provides the corrective solution feeding the certificate services with information
about misbehaving nodes, which are eliminated from the network by certificate
revocation. Both certificate services and IDS are designed to be robust even in the
presence of compromised nodes.
In our design, protection of the routing protocol includes both preventive and
corrective security services. A certificate-based authentication service for the routing
protocol messages is considered as a basic preventive solution. The authentication service
aims to avoid an attack to be generated from a nonauthenticated node. However,
according to the presumed adversary model, attacks are still possible in two situations:
(1) an authenticated node (e.g. certificate holder) starts to behave maliciously; or (2) a
MANET node has been compromised and the authentication secret (e.g. private key)
from that node has been exposed.
The corrective security service is provided in terms of an intrusion detection and
response system (IDS). Intrusion response consists mainly in the isolation of
malicious/compromised nodes, excluding them from the routing service. This is
accomplished basically by means of certificate revocation. Certification services and
intrusion detection and response should be provided in a self-organized and distributed
manner by a Local Certification Service (LEGT) and a Local IDS (FNIDS and RIDS)
instances. Figure 5.1 illustrates the proposed protection model.
Basically, routing protocol, certification service and IDS (alert) message
exchanges must be authenticated with a MANET authentication extension (MAE), which
is appended to each message and provides the authentication information. Authentication
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is based on the certification service and uses asymmetric cryptography primitives. Each
node in the MANET must hold a valid certificate, binding the node's identity to its public
key.
In order to maintaining the robustness of the security solution in the presence of
compromised nodes, security services in our system are designed to have k-by-n security,
in the sense that any certification service or intrusion response must be collaboratively
provided by, at least, k nodes, where n is the total (nonfixed) number of nodes in the
network. Thus, for compromising a security service, an adversary must break into k
different nodes. Correct nodes running the IDS must detect the attacks against the routing
protocol and isolate the compromised node (by revoking its certificate) before that an
adversary can compromise k nodes, breaking the collaborative security system.
Given that collaboration is done by means of authenticated messages (certificate
services and IDS messages are all authenticated using MAE), isolating a node is
equivalent to revoking the node's certificate. An indirect revocation mechanism is related
to certification expiration. Thus, security can be improved if we require that certificates
must be renewed from time to time. Certificates are issued with constrained certificate
expiration time. Each node having a valid certificate must request for a new certificate,
before the current certificate has expired. Nodes that are not well behaving should not
have their certificates renewed.
Finally, locality requirement states that collaboration should be designed to
restrict communications among group (e.g. local-enforced certificate services and IDS)
around nearby nodes, usually in the local neighborhood. This is an important requirement
as it relates to the scalability of the overall solution. Considering the locality requirement
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stated above, k becomes an important parameter and should be related to the average size
of neighborhoods in the network. If a node has k or more neighbors, IDS and certification
services can be fully provided in the local neighborhood. Thus, the security solution is
scalable, in the sense that security services are run locally, provided a convenient choice
for parameter k.
Figure 5.1 Routing protocol protection model.
5.3 Overview of a Quantitative Model
Conventionally, risk scenarios involve possible chance-based catastrophic failures with
scarce modeling of maliciously designed human interventions that threaten inherent
system vulnerabilities. Risk scenarios concerning critical computer communication
networks are now more pervasive and severe than ever before because of the cost of
nonmalicious chance failures that occur due to insufficient testing and lack of adequate
reliability. We can use software reliability modeling and testing techniques to examine
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these chance failures in more detail. However, for the intentional failures or malicious
activities that critically increase the risk of illdefined attacks, no one has ever thoroughly
modeled a physical scenario, at least not one that considers a unified consistent scheme of
vulnerabilities, threats, and countermeasures. A quantitative risk assessment provides
results in numbers that management can understand, whereas a qualitative approach,
although easier to implement, makes it difficult to trace generalized results.
In [53], authors propose a modification of some of the decision-tree-based
model's qualitative attributes, in case the quantitative data are unavailable. The proposed
model is practical and simple to use for beginners in the field, but it also provides a
mathematical—statistical foundation on which strategists or practitioners can construct a
practical risk valuation. The probabilistic assumptions, such as using a uniformly
distributed random variable for the input variables, can be improved by using other
statistical distributions. Other techniques used hitherto within a nonprobabilistic frame,
such as attack trees, don't provide an accurate overall picture of the risk to the system
that's being protected
Three ingredients are involved in the quantitative model and their probabilities are
used as input to calculate the residual risk of a system [53], as shown in Figure 5.1 They
are vulnerability, threat, and countermeasure (CM). A system may have several
vulnerabilities that could be exploited by an attacker. If the probability of the ith
vulnerability is V i, then = 1 . Threat is any circumstance or event with the potential
to adversely impact a system, through unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure,
modification of data, or denial of service. For each vulnerability, there may have several
threats and E T =1 , where Ti is the probability of the ith threat to a specific
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vulnerability. A CM is a measure that reduces risk of a thread to a system. Consequently,
the residual risk is the portion of risk remaining after a CM is applied. Residual risk could
be "none" if a perfect CM exists. The residual risk of a system is calculated is illustrated
in Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2 The quantitative security-meter probability model.
5.4 Quantitative Analysis of MANS
In this section we conduct the quantitative analysis on MANS using the model introduced
in last section. We firstly summarized the vulnerabilities and the threats in MANETs, and
the corresponding countermeasures provided by MANS, in Table 5.l.
Next, we assign the probability for each element. To simplify, we assume that all
vulnerabilities have the same probability to be exploited by an attack. That is, if there are
n vulnerabilities in a system, the probability that each vulnerability could be exploited is
1/n. The same idea applies on the threat probability assignment. Also, we assume that if a
threat is completely prevented by a countermeasure, the probability of lack of
countermeasure is 0; if a threat is partially prevented by a countermeasure, the probability
of countermeasure is 0.5 and the probability of lack of countermeasure is 1-0.5=0.5; if
there is no any countermeasure to a threat, then the probability of lack of countermeasure
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is 1. In MANS, the probability input could vary, depending on the actual countermeasure
(FIDS, neighborhood watch, LEGT, etc.) in actual scenarios.
Table 5.1 Probabilistic Input Data for Vulnerabilities, Threats and Countermeasures in
MANS
Vulnerability Threat Countermeasure(CM) LCM
Routing protocol
V1=1/5
Malicious routing query
Flooding to non-exist nodes
Fabrication of error messages
Spoofing
MAE
FNIDS true detection
FNIDS false
negative
Services
Availability
V2=1/5
ICMP flooding
UDP flooding
Fragmentation attack
Syn flooding
FNIDS true detection for
each kind of attack
FNIDS false
negative for each
kind of attack
Probe & scan
V3=1/5
Fin scan
Tcp Scan
Null Scan
Stealthy Scan
RIDS true detection for
each kind of attack
RIDS false
negative for each
kind of attack
confidentiality
V4=1/5
Passive attack
eavesdropping
AES session key
Authentication,
V5=1/5
Error-prone wireless Link
Compromised nodes (less than t
nodes)
Compromised nodes (more than
t nodes)
CM41=Certificate renew
successful ratio
CM42=1
CM43=0
LCM41=1-
certificate renew
successful ratio
LCM42=0
LCM43=1
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Figure 5.3 Example of quantitative risk assessment model.
According to the example showed in figure 5.2, we calculate the residue risk after
applying MANS as routing protocol for the ad hoc network where have vulnerability and
threat parameters defined as above.
For example, for the scenario: mobility speed 20 m/s, packet drop rate 0.5%,
background traffic 500kbps, the total residue risk is calculated as 0.0764.
In above discussion, we introduced a new evaluation method for MANS.
Quantitative risk evaluation model could be used as a tool to conduct comparison
between different scenarios, mechanisms. It offers clear view on the strength of a secure
system.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, the challenge of provision of security in Mobile Ad-Hoc Network
(MANET) environments is tackled. The most important characterizing feature of a
MANET is the absence of any node in a central role. So many security services that rely
on central services, such as naming services, certification authorities (CA), network-
based intrusion detection and other recovery administrative services will be impossible or
at least much harder to implement. Another nagging major challenge is that of the
compromised node(s); this could be an overtaken attacked node or a physically captured
node. This forces all MANET nodes to operate in a mode that "trusts no peer" that
complicates and inhibits security services.
Protection of Ad Hoc networks basically focus on two aspects: Intrusion
Prevention, such as traffic encryption, sending data through multiple paths, authentication
and authorization; Intrusion Detection, such as Anomaly pattern examination, Protocol
analytical study. However, intrusion prevention cannot guard against internal attacks
when an adversary has broken in, while intrusion detection itself is not enough because:
Detecting intrusion must compiled with recovery response to remove the malicious hosts;
IDS can only rely on partial and local data because of lack of traffic concentration, such
as routers and switches in Ad Hoc networks; Separation between normal and abnormal is
difficult in Ad Hoc networks. Moreover, secure routing is another important protection
for Mobile Ad Hoc networks because routing protocol is an easy target of tearing down
whole network functionality.
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In this dissertation, the architecture of the Mobile Ad-hoc Network Security
(MANS) System is proposed, under which authentication agent, IDS agent, recovery
policy and other policies can be defined formally and explicitly, and are enforced by a
uniform architecture. As a basic preventive solution, a fully localized, digital certificate
base authentication services is proposed. An intrusion Detection and response system
(IDS) provides the corrective solution feeding the certificate services with information
about misbehaving nodes, which are eliminated from the network by certificate
revocation. Both certificate services and IDS are designed to be robust even in the
presence of compromised nodes.
This novel authentication scheme (LEGT) is based on asymmetric cryptographic
techniques, specifically RSA algorithms. Authentication service is provided by taking a
certificate-based approach.
An IDS is installed in every node, which is responsible for colleting local data
from its host node and neighbor nodes within its communication range, pro-processing
raw data and periodically broadcasting to its neighborhood, classifying normal or
abnormal based on pro-processed data from its host node and neighbor nodes.
Security recovery policy in ad hoc networks is the procedure of making a global
decision according to messages received from distributed IDS and restore to operational
health the whole system if any user or host that conducts the inappropriate, incorrect, or
anomalous activities that threaten the connectivity or reliability of the networks and the
authenticity of the data traffic in the networks.
Manet routing protocol is also secured by combing Certificate-based
authentication and Intrusion Detection in MANS architecture. Secure routing is not main
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concern of MANS but by providing the architecture of interaction between authentication
agent, routing agent, Intrusion detection agent, MANS is capable of secure routing.
Finally, quantitative risk assessment model is also proposed to numerically
evaluate MANS security, to comprehensively analyze vulnerabilities, threats,
countermeasures and lack of countermeasures of MANS.
In the future, MANS extension in following applications will be further explored:
1) False positive mitigation for wireless environments.
2) Countermeasure for some specific routing attacks, such as Blackhole,
Wormhole.
3) Parameter selection for routing attacks.
APPENDIX
MONITORED STATISTICAL FEATURES
This appendix gives the detailed descriptions on the statistical features monitored by
Flow-base Network Intrusion detection.
The FNIDS is capable of monitoring traffic into and out of the protected network.
The FNIDS statistical features can be categorized based on the protocols of network
traffic.
1. IP Packet Length measures the averages and the distributions of the IP packet lengths
within a time window. For simplicity, this parameter is symbolized as "ip-pkt-len"
afterward.
2. IP Packet Rate measures the averages and the distributions of the packet rates of all
observed IP packets within a time window. This feature will be symbolized as "ip-
pkt-rate" afterward.
3. IP Byte Rate measures the averages and the distributions of the byte rates of all
observed IP packets within a time window. This feature will be symbolized as "ip-
byt-rate" afterward.
4. IP Fragment Rate measures the averages and the distributions of the packet rates of
all observed IP fragments within a time window. This feature will be symbolized as
"ip-frag-rate" afterward.
5. IP Defragmentation Error Rate measures the averages and the distributions of the
IP defragmentation error rates occurred within a time window. This feature will be
symbolized as "ip-defrag-error" afterward.
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6. IP Checksum Error Rate measures the averages and the distributions of the IP
checksum error rates occurred within a time window. This feature will be symbolized
as "ip-csum-error" afterward.
7. TCP Invalid Packet Rate measures the averages and the distributions of the rates of
the TCP packets with invalid combinations of TCP control flags. This feature will be
symbolized as "tcp-pkt-invalid".
8. TCP Packet Length measures the averages and the distributions of the lengths of IP
packets within a time window. This feature will be symbolized as "tcp-pkt-len".
9. TCP Packet Rate measures the averages and the distributions of the TCP packet rates
within a time window. This feature will be symbolized as "tcp-pkt-rate".
10. TCP SYN Packet Rate measures the averages and the distributions of the rates of
TCP control packets with SYN flag set within a time window. This feature will be
symbolized as "tcp-syn-pkt-rate" afterward.
11. TCP FIN Packet Rate measures the averages and the distributions of the rates of
TCP control packets with FIN flag set within a time window. This feature will be
symbolized as "tcp-fin-pkt-rate" afterward.
12. TCP RST Packet Rate measures the averages and the distributions of the rates of
TCP control packets with RST flag set within a time window. This feature will be
symbolized as "tcp-rst-pkt-rate" afterward.
13. TCP Connection Open Rate measures the averages and the distributions of the TCP
connection open rates within a time window. This feature will be symbolized as "tcp-
con-new-opened" afterward.
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14. TCP Connection Close Rate measures the averages and the distributions of the TCP
connection close rate within a time window. This feature will be symbolized as "tcp-
con-new-closed" afterward.
15. TCP Connection Abort Rate measures the averages and the distributions of the TCP
connection abort rate (connection closed by RESET or TIMEOUT other than normal
three-way hand shaking) within a time window. This feature will be symbolized as
"tcp-con-new-aborted" afterward.
16. TCP Connections from Different Source Address measures the distributions of
TCP connections from different source IP addresses within a time window. This
feature will be symbolized as "tcp-con-diff-src" afterward.
17. TCP Connection to Different Destination Address measures the distributions of
TCP connections to different destination IP addresses within a time window. This
feature will be symbolized as "tcp-con-diff-dst" afterward.
18. TCP Connection Anomalous Entropy measures the averages and the distributions
of the anomalous entropies of all TCP connections within a time window. This
feature was first proposed in Staniford [37]. The equation to calculate the connection
anomalous entropy is given in Equation 7.1. This feature will be symbolized as "
tcp-con-anomalous-entropy" afterward.
19. TCP Connection Half Opened Ratio measures the averages and the distributions of
the ratio between the half-opened TCP connections and all TCP connections within a
time window. This feature will be symbolized as "tcp-con-half-opened-ratio"
afterward.
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20. TCP Connection Duration measures the averages and the distributions of the TCP
connection durations within a time window. This feature will be symbolized as "
tcp-con-duration" afterward.
21. UDP Packet Length measures the averages and the distributions of UDP packets
within a time window. This feature is symbolized as "udp-pkt-len" afterward.
22. UDP Packet Rate measures the averages and the distributions of UDP packets within
a time window. This feature will be referred as "udp-pkt-rate" afterward.
23. UDP Byte Rate measures the averages and the distributions of UDP packets within a
time window. This feature will be referred as "udp-byt-rate" afterward.
24. UDP Packets from Different Sources measures the distributions of UDP packets
from different IP addresses. This feature will be referred as "udp-diff-src" afterward.
25. UDP Packet to Different Destinations measures the distributions of UDP packets
destined to different IP addresses. This feature will be referred as "udp-diff-dst"
afterward.
26. ICMP Packet Length measures the averages and the distributions of ICMP packet
lengths within a time window. This feature will be referred as "icmp-pkt-len"
afterward.
27. ICMP Packet Rate measures the averages and the distributions of ICMP packets
within a time window. This feature will be symbolized as "icmp-pkt-rate" afterward.
28. ICMP Packets from Different Sources measures the distributions of ICMP packets
originated from different IP addresses within a time window. This feature will be
symbolized as "icmp-diff-src" afterward.
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29. ICMP Packet to Different Destinations measures the distributions of ICMP packets
destined to different IP addresses within a time window. This feature will be referred
as "icmp-diff-dst" afterward.
30. ICMP Anomalous Echo Replies measures the averages and the distributions of
anomalous ICMP echo replies, which are ICMP echo reply packets without previous
echo request packets, within a time window. This feature will be referred as "icmp-
anomalous-echo-reply" afterward.
31. ICMP DUR Packet Rate measures the averages and the distributions of ICMP DUR
(destination-Unreachable) packets within a time window. This feature will be referred
as "icmp-dur-pkt-rate" afterward.
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